

# **Alike at the Core, Different at the Margins: a Comparative Analysis of Party Preferences between Immigrant and Native Voters at the 2017 Bundestag Election**

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## **Abstract:**

This paper presents evidence from the first national immigrant election face-to-face survey ever conducted in Germany. Using data on German voters with a (post-)Soviet and Turkish background at the 2017 Bundestag election, the paper answers the following questions: How well can the Michigan Model (Campbell et al. 1960), as the standard model of voting, explain immigrant party preferences in Germany? How do immigrant voters differ – if at all – from native voters? The empirical analyses on propensities to vote for all major parties in Bundestag yield the following results: (1) The Michigan Model explains the party preferences of immigrant voters well. Immigrant voters use long-term memories of relationships with parties (party identification) and short-term evaluations, such as competence evaluations, to assess parties. They also relate their own issue positions to that of the parties in order to minimise distances. (2) Short-term factors are more important among immigrant compared to native voters, mirroring the shorter collective historical experience with parties. (3) Immigrant-specific factors neither have direct, nor substantial moderating effect. (4) However, immigrant-specific factors affect the emergence of political attitudes necessary to position oneself in political space. Overall, the party preferences of immigrant voters follow the same model as natives at the core with small differences at the margins.

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# 1 Introduction

The integration of immigrants into host societies is at the heart of several debates in the social sciences. Abundant literatures have evolved around the structural (e.g., Koopmans 2010; Teltemann *et al.* 2015; van Tubergen *et al.* 2004), cultural (e.g., Joppke 2005, 2007; Pécoud 2004; Pulzer 2007; Wimmer and Soehl 2014), social (e.g., Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Lantermann and Hänze 1999) and identificational (e.g. Rapp 2018; Schildkraut 2005) integration of immigrants in the US and Western Europe. However, the political integration of immigrants remains largely under-explored when compared to these other dimensions, and at the heart of political integration lies the electoral behaviour of immigrants.

This article is about immigrants and their descendants as German voters at the 2017 Bundestag election. The overwhelming majority of studies in this realm stem from the US. Here, especially turnout and – less often – party choice of Latino immigrants have been analysed (La Garza *et al.* 1996; La Garza and Cortina 2007; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Shaw *et al.* 2000), either by applying standard models of electoral research or theoretical concepts that have been developed for the analyses of racial minorities such as African-Americans (Dawson 1994; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). In contrast to this, scholarship on the party choice of immigrant voters is still in its infancy in Europe (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Sanders *et al.* 2014).

Hence, we first address the question of whether immigrants’ party preferences<sup>1</sup> can be explained by the general classics of electoral research. For Europe, this crucial question regarding the electoral consequences of immigrants as voters has remained largely unaddressed so far – not caused by a lack of interest but mainly by a lack of available data. Furthermore, studies on immigrant electoral behaviour that integrate established theories from electoral research and immigrant-specific factors are scarce. Thus, we, secondly, address if and how they affect electoral behaviour after we control for the standard explanatory factors. There are three ways how immigrant-specific factors might affect party choice directly, i.e. adding additional explanatory power to the model, moderating how the standard model works, or affecting the existence of the standard model’s factors in the first place.

We focus on immigrants and their children as voters in the German federal election of September 2017. Around 6.3 million immigrant voters<sup>2</sup> defined as first and second-generation immigrants were eligible to vote in the last federal election (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) 2017), which represents around 10 percent of the entire electorate, compared with 15 percent in the US. Our

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<sup>1</sup> We analyse party preferences, operationalized as propensities-to-vote, that range on a scale from 0 to 10. We use both terms interchangeably.

<sup>2</sup> We use the term immigrant voters to denote German citizens who migrated to Germany themselves or who are the child of at least one immigrant parent. This term is not perfect because second-generation immigrants are not literally immigrants, but alternative concepts, such as ethnic minority voters do not fit better as the largest group, the Russian Germans, see themselves as ethnic Germans. In German, the term “Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund” is broader, but does not include the cut-off point after the second generation, either.

analysis will focus on the two largest groups, Russian Germans and Germans from Turkey, using data from the Immigrant German Election Survey (IMGES). The survey was fielded as a post-election survey to the federal election of 2017 and has been designed to be comparable to the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), allowing direct comparison between immigrant and native voters.

In essence, our findings suggest that this standard model of vote choice can explain a large part of the differences in party preferences among immigrant voters as compared with natives. However, we also address the role of three prominent immigrant-specific factors for vote choice: the length of stay in Germany, ethnic identity, and discrimination experiences; and analyse if they either have their own effect, moderate the relationship with the Michigan determinants and party preferences or affect the existence of these political attitudes and attachments much earlier in the causal chain.

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews our theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the data collection, the data set and our analytical strategy. Section 4 reveals the empirical results whose interpretations are then discussed in a wider setting in the concluding section 5.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Our Argument: Immigrant Voters Behave like Native Voters once they Have Developed Political Attitudes Prior to Forming Party Preferences

We aim to reconcile the classic approach to party voting in Germany, the Michigan Model, with immigrant-specific approaches to voting applied mostly in other countries. We argue that, at the core, immigrant voter behaviour functions exactly like that of native voters causally close to the voting decision. The core elements of the Michigan model, party identification, candidate evaluation and issue competency, work for immigrant voters as they do for natives. However, the strength of the factors is predictably different: the long-term factor party identification's impact is less strong reflecting the lesser intensity with which the socialisation environment, family and duration in the country have had an influence on immigrant voters. Moreover, the central individual characteristics that only describe immigrant voters and their social experience can be fruitfully incorporated into the theoretical model. They are relevant in the formative stages of the party preferences, what we call the margins, in that immigrants differ most strongly from natives in the ways in which they dispose of an individual political space in their minds. Immigrant characteristics can help us explain the formation of immigrant voter attitudes necessary for them to come to an electoral decision. In other words, immigrant voters who have other than non-attitudes in those judgements that are necessary to form a party preference are indistinguishable from the majority group of natives in which political non-attitudes are very rare.

## 2.2 The Classic Michigan Model and Its Application for Explaining Immigrants' Party Preferences

To analyse electoral preferences and vote choice, three major schools of explanation prevail in literature: (a) sociological approaches (Lazarsfeld *et al.* 1948; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) explaining vote choice with memberships/belonging to social groups deeply rooted in society's political conflict lines, (b) the Michigan model (Campbell *et al.* 1954; Campbell *et al.* 1960) mainly relying on psychological factors and (c) spatial models of political competition (Downs 1957).

As sociological approaches<sup>3</sup> are not able to explain short-term developments convincingly, the most used approaches in Germany as well as in other countries are the Michigan model and Spatial Models (Dancey and Goren 2010; Johnston 2006; Lewis-Beck *et al.* 2008). Of those, only the Michigan model combines short-term factors that might explain deviating vote choice as well as long-term factors that might explain a persisting pattern in party support. Furthermore, the Michigan model was shown to be the most influential model for vote choice in Germany (Krämer and Rattinger 1997; Neundorf and Adams 2018; Norpoth 1979; Schoen and Weins 2005), so we will employ it as the standard model of vote choice for which we compare immigrant with native voters.

The Michigan model (Campbell *et al.* 1960) is one of the most commonly used theoretical approaches for the explanation of individual voting behaviour in established democracies. Its key concept, party identification, denotes a long-standing, affective, psychological link with a political party (Campbell *et al.* 1960: 121). Party identification functions as a perceptual screen and, accordingly, directly affects the candidates' perception and assessment of the issues, positions and competences, as well as the identifier's voting decision in a direct and indirect way (Campbell *et al.* 1960: 133-136). Within a funnel of causality, social group belongings and other socio-demographic factors are part of the model, but causally placed before the three components of the Michigan model. Hence, these factors indirectly affect the voting decision, mainly mediated through party identification. Party identification itself is acquired in primary socialization. It is a stable construct that only changes with major life events, such as a political crisis or personal changes such as marriage or moving to another city (Campbell *et al.* 1960: 133-138).

While the Michigan model has been applied to the study of native voters for decades (see Johnston 2006 for an overview), it has rarely been used for explaining immigrant voting behaviour and even less often to explain vote choice (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007; La Garza and Cortina 2007; Leal *et al.* 2008; Nuño 2007; Strijbis 2014; Teney *et al.* 2010; Wüst 2004). Only three of these studies used natives as a control group and tally for the interpretation of the results for immigrants

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<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, as we are interested in explaining patterns of vote choice over all parties instead of running specific models, we refrain from using SES factors, such as occupation or income, as these have contrary coefficients and would cancel each other out, e.g. occupation as a worker has in general a positive impact on voting for parties from the left, but a negative impact on voting for parties from the right.

(Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; Sanders *et al.* 2014; Strijbis 2014) and only one of these included immigrant-specific factors such as discrimination and ethnic identity (Sanders *et al.* 2014).

Most of these studies showed that the Michigan model can also be applied to the explanation of immigrant vote choice (DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007; Nuño 2007; Sanders *et al.* 2014; Strijbis 2014), while spatial and economic considerations as such are of lesser importance (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; Wüst 2004). Pooled analyses of immigrants' vote choice for the two major German parties point into the same direction (Wüst 2004). Hence, we expect that in principle the Michigan model explains immigrant voting behaviour in the same way as native voting behaviour.

*H1: The three determinants of the Michigan model have the same direction of impact on propensities to vote for immigrants and natives.*

Theoretically, the application of the Michigan model to immigrant voters seems less problematic for short-term factors such as political issues and candidate orientations, which immigrants might evaluate in the same way as native voters do. However, the application of the Michigan model's central concept - party identification - to the group of immigrant voters seems more problematic. Party identification is mainly acquired during primary socialization and therefore substantively transmitted within the family. It is therefore unclear how first generation immigrants develop party identification and pass it on to their children. Previous studies show that immigrant voters use ideological positions and their previous partisanship to acquire party identification. However, this effect depends on the political system of the country-of-origin and cannot be assumed for immigrants from non-democratic countries as well as for immigrants with great discrepancies between party systems (Cain *et al.* 1991; Finifter and Finifter 1989; Kroh and Tucci 2010; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005). In our case, previous party identification in the country-of-origin cannot be adapted to the new environment as immigrants in our study originate from the former Soviet Union and Turkey, countries with only brief periods of democratic freedom and/or with different political systems. Therefore, immigrants have to start again with becoming familiar with a political system and develop long-standing attachments. Thus, the share of partisans is much lower among immigrants than among native voters (e.g. Finifter and Finifter 1989; Kroh and Tucci 2010; Wüst 2004). However, short-term evaluations should evolve much faster as long one is interested in politics.

In general, the weight of each of the three factors, i.e. how much variance of party choice is explained by which variable, differs by election and is not predetermined by the theoretical model (e.g. Johnston 2006). Hence, we compare coefficients between natives and immigrant voters. Thus, we assume that party identification does not explain electoral choices as well as it does for the group of natives (Sanders *et al.* 2014). On the other hand, short-term factors such as candidate evaluations and issue orientations should be of more importance for immigrant voters.

*H2: Party identification is of more importance for the explanation of party preferences of natives than of immigrant voters, whereas candidate evaluations and issue orientations matter more for immigrant voters than for natives.*

## 2.3 Including Immigrant-specific Factors in Analyses of Party Preferences

We now turn to immigrant-specific approaches for the explanation of party preferences, i.e. to characteristics that do not vary for natives or do not have meaningful values, such as length of stay in the country. Previous studies on the determinants of vote choice, which also included the Michigan model, mostly could not use immigrant-specific indicators such as identification with the country-of-origin or discrimination experience due to the lack of data availability (see the discussion in the section above). Hence, we can only rely on few of these studies and have to adapt others that analysed turnout for our purposes.

By including such factors into a general model of electoral behaviour, they could affect electoral behaviour in three possible ways: (1) immigrant-specific factors may add additional explanatory power to the standard model, as they have their own statistically significant, direct relationship with party preferences, (2) immigrant-specific factors may not have a direct relationship with party preferences but may moderate the way the core variable of the Michigan model are connected to party preferences, (3) immigrant-specific factors may affect electoral behaviour, but not in a way that we thought of before: Instead of having direct/moderating effects, they touch the core of the Michigan model insofar as they affect the existence of political attitudes and attachments per se.

In the following section, we will lay down the immigrant-specific variables we are going to use and the ways they might affect party preferences.

### 2.3.1 Central Immigrant-specific Factors

Immigrant-specific factors can be classified into three broad groups: institutional structures, situational context, and individual characteristics (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Institutional structures, e.g. how immigrant representation is situated in the political system of a country, matter more for comparative, cross-national research and cannot be the focus of our study (e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; Vries and Tillman 2011). In each country, the situational context includes the representation of immigrants as candidates that can possibly lead towards political alienation and abstention (Pantoja *et al.* 2001), which is also not the focus of our study. We thus focus on individual characteristics and group them according to their belonging to a certain dimension of integration: Cognitive integration, structural integration, social integration, and social identification integration (e.g. Heckmann and Schnapper 2016). Previous studies of immigrants' electoral behaviour analysed factors of cognitive integration, such as language skills (La Garza and Cortina 2007; Leal *et al.* 2008), factors of structural integration, such as length of stay (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010), social integration such as discrimination and ethnic networks (Heath *et al.* 2013; Oskooii 2018; Sanders *et al.* 2014; Schildkraut 2005) and social identification integration such as national and ethnic identity (Rapp 2018; Sanders *et al.* 2014; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005).

We will rely on the three most used factors for the analyses of vote choice, which are length of stay, discrimination, and ethnic identity.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.3.2 Direct Effects of Immigrant-specific factors on Party Preferences to Reach Additional Explanatory Power

How may immigrant-specific factors affect party preferences? We first look at the direct effects of these factors on party preferences that might bypass traditional explanation such as the Michigan model. The only study that included standard models for vote choice and immigrant specific factors, Sanders *et al.* (2014), showed that there is a distinctive “calculus” of immigrant voting with direct effects of variables such as (sociotropic) discrimination. The authors conclude “that a single vote-choice model with a token ethnic minority dummy variable is inadequate” (Sanders *et al.* 2014: 247). Hence, we include three immigrant-specific factors in our analyses.

First, we can assume that first-generation immigrants are affected by socialization in their respective country-of origin, as previous studies showed that the **length of stay** enhances turnout and shapes vote choice (DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007; Nuño 2007; Sanders *et al.* 2014; Teney *et al.* 2010; Wüst 2004). The longer immigrants live in the host country, the more familiar they become with the political system per se (e.g. DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007). Thus, the length of stay might increase the likelihood for all parties to be voted for by immigrant voters.

Second, several studies stress the importance of immigrants’ **social identity** for vote choice (e.g. Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Dawson 1994; Teney *et al.* 2010). According to the Social Identity Approach (Tajfel and Turner 1979), social categorizations are cognitive instruments that are used to systematically order the social environment into in- and out-groups. However, being part of a social category or group by birth (e.g. an ethnicity or nationality) does not shape perceptions per se. Only when this membership becomes part of one’s social identity, “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981: 255), it substantially affects attitudes and behaviour by the process of de-personalization. Thus, having an ethnic identity that becomes salient leads towards to the process of perceiving oneself in terms of one’s in-group and subconsciously trying to become close to a prototypical group member. From this perspective, the political preferences by immigrants are affected by their belonging to an immigrant group that has minority status (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Cain *et al.* 1991; Dawson 1994; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005).<sup>5</sup> This can explain why vote choice of immigrant groups might be caused by ethnic identity (La Garza and Cortina 2007): When political decisions have to be made, in-group identification with the ethnic group becomes salient, depersonalization arises and group members tend to vote more

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<sup>4</sup> We will not analyse ethnic networks because these other three factors are easier to integrate into Michigan model, whereas the role of (ethnic) networks stems from its mobilizing role for political participation.

<sup>5</sup> The used terms and employed measures differ heavily (group voting/ethnic identity/linked fate/group consciousness).

coherently; here, ethnic identity replaces party identification, especially for migrants that do not already have developed partisan attachments (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010). In our case, we look at the general pattern of party preferences of immigrants. Previous studies showed that ethnic identity is negatively connected with political participation (Sanders *et al.* 2014); feeling as being part of a minority enhances the distance to the political system and therefore has an inhibiting effect on political integration (Mayer, Hamidou, Goerres 2019).

Third, individuals' political participation, turnout and vote choice might be affected by their perception of subjective **discrimination**. Discrimination can be further distinguished into subforms such as personally experienced discrimination (egocentric, Sanders *et al.* 2014 or societal, Oskooii 2018) and perceived discrimination against one's own ethnic group (sociotropic, Sanders *et al.* 2014 or political, Oskooii 2018). Both are related but distinct concepts that have different consequences: Sanders *et al.* (2014) report group-based discrimination to be related to vote choice for the British Labour party (compared to the Conservatives), whereas personal discrimination is negatively related to voting for the incumbent party. Oskooii (2018) finds personally experienced discrimination significantly negatively related to turnout, but finds no such an effect for group-based discrimination. As discrimination is correlated with feelings of withdrawal and depression (e.g. Schildkraut 2005), it could negatively affect the individual's participation in the political system and its willingness to vote for political parties in general, especially if they feel targeted personally.

We assume that these three immigrant-specific factors could bypass the Michigan trias by adding a new explanatory way of general party preferences, even when the three factors of the Michigan model are controlled for.

*H3: The longer immigrant voters stay in the host country,*

*...the less discriminated they feel against,*

*...the less they identify with the country-of-origin,*

*... the higher their propensities to vote are on average.*

In addition, we have to take the interplay between group identity and discrimination into account. Discrimination may either enhance group consciousness or group identity (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Dawson 1994; Schildkraut 2005; Skrobanek 2009) or lead to the development of an ethnic group identity in the first place (Wong *et al.* 2005). In consequence, discrimination may act as a moderator: Schildkraut (2005) shows that discrimination enhances participation among Latinos with high ethnic identity, but not among those with low ethnic identity (Fischer-Neumann 2014 shows similar findings for Turkish immigrants).

*H4: Reported discrimination counter-balances the negative effect of ethnic identification on propensities to vote, so that it becomes positive for the highest values of discrimination.*

### 2.3.3 Moderating Effects by Immigrant-specific Factors within the Michigan model

Another possible relationship could be a moderating effect of immigrant-specific factors on the Michigan determinants. There are almost no previous studies on this specific set-up (except for Bergh and Bjørklund 2010), while others, such as Sanders *et al.* (2014) include moderating effects, but only between immigrant-specific factors and other variables such as cultural practices. We assume that this moderating effect occurs specifically for party identification as it is the central factor in the Michigan model that is not as easily accessible to newcomers as the two other short-term factors. First, we know from previous studies that the longer immigrants live in the host country, the more similar their voting patterns become to those of natives: Studies from Germany and Norway could show that the likelihood of having acquired party identification increases substantially with every year in the country and thus enhances the link between party identification and party preferences (e.g. Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; Kroh and Tucci 2010). Second, in the section above we postulated that ethnic identity might replace party identification and lead to the occurrence of group voting. However, we can also expect a moderating relationship. Previous studies already linked the concept of party identification with ethnic identity: having a strong ethnic identity, thus being conscious that the individual fate is closely connected to the ethnic or racial group, fosters the occurrence of party identification and thus positively affects the weight of party identification for vote choice, as studies from the United States show (Dawson 1994; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005). Thus, we could assume that ethnic identity moderates the link between party identification and party preferences: those that identify highly with an ethnic group might also vote more in line with their party identification. Last, discrimination is expected to act as an inhibiting factor: Personally experienced discrimination may prevent partisans from voting for their identification party, as they want to punish their party (for a similar argument see Sanders *et al.* 2014).

*H5: Immigrant-specific factors moderate the effect of party identification on party preferences: Length of stay and ethnic identity – individually- amplify the positive effect of party identification, discrimination mitigates the positive effect of party identification towards zero.*

### 2.3.4 Immigrant-specific Factors as Predictors of Non-Attitudes Central to the Michigan Model

Besides a direct and a moderating relationship, immigrant-specific factors could also affect the existence of political attitudes and attachments prior to the mechanisms that lead to the formation of party preferences. From this perspective, “don’t know”-answers do not capture missing values, but are valid responses from those that do not possess such attitudes and attachments and are therefore not able to react to the stimulus of the question (Kroh 2006). It is important to note that missing values could either occur because of genuine non-attitudes or effects of social desirability. In the latter case, we would not call missing values valid answers, but hidden answers. To our knowledge, only one study so far used this perspective for the analyses of migrants’ political attitudes: Wals (2013) finds that being able to place oneself on the left-right scale in the United States is heavily related to having this ability for the

Mexican system, and to a lesser extent to the years spent in the United States as well as to language skills.

Existing studies on the survey behaviour of immigrants find lower unit response rates among immigrants than among natives (e.g. Ahlmark *et al.* 2015; Deding *et al.* 2008). However, only few studies compare item non-response between both groups and report mixed findings. If there are higher item non-response rates, they are assumed to be caused by lower language skills and/or missing knowledge for cultural references (e.g. Agadjanian and Zotova 2012; Ahlmark *et al.* 2015). Interviewer characteristics seem to matter mostly for ethnicity related questions (Abrajano and Alvarez 2018; Anderson *et al.* 1988; West and Blom 2016), e.g. the religion of the interviewer and questions related to religious attitudes (Blaydes and Gillum 2013). If other factors such as education are controlled for, immigrants show more or less the same levels of social desirability as natives (Ahlmark *et al.* 2015). Considering the factors of the Michigan model, we assume that neither party identification nor candidate evaluations nor issue orientations are particularly prone to social desirability.

We assume that ethnic identity and discrimination also affect the existence of attitudes and attachments, and as in H2 and H3, we expect them to be inhabiting factors that negatively relate to the existence of party identification, issue orientations, and candidate evaluations.

*H6: The longer the length of stay, the lower the perceived levels of discrimination, and the lower the identification with the country-of-origin, the more likely immigrants are to reveal political attitudes and attachments rather than don't knows.*

## 3 Data and Methods

### 3.1 Data

The data were drawn from the Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES), a post-election study that was fielded after the German federal election (24<sup>th</sup> of September 2017) from 4<sup>th</sup> of October until 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 2018. IMGES targeted the two biggest groups of immigrants in Germany, people from Turkey and people from the former Soviet-Union and its successor states. This study imitated the set-up of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) for the sampling framework (all Germans aged 16 and above), field time and also included many of the same items to be able to draw comparisons.

In total, 1,020 interviews were realized. For our analyses, we restrict the sample to all participants that were aged 18 and older on election day (N=947). We weight our data with a post-stratification weight that takes differences in selection probability due to sample design and non-response into account (for more details see Goerres and Spies *et al.* 2018).

## 3.2 Operationalization of Variables

### 3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Propensities to Vote

We rely on propensities to vote<sup>6</sup> for our analyses that have been successfully employed in analyses of voting behaviour for many different countries (e.g. Angelis and Garzia 2013; Boonen *et al.* 2014; Garry 2007; Johann *et al.* 2016; Selb and Lachat 2009; Tillie 1995; van der Eijk *et al.* 2006). These new measures have several advantages compared to nominal scales variables of vote choice: First, it is possible to distinguish better between the choice set a voter chooses from and the actual voting decision (van der Eijk *et al.* 2006). It is assumed that the voter chooses the party from the choice set that has the highest electoral utility. This differentiation does not matter much in two-party systems where vote choice is simply choosing between one or the other party and voters usually do not prefer both at the same time. However, in multi-party systems, where voters have high utilities for several parties, using PTV items adds additional information about party preferences: they allow us to tap current party preferences for several parties in a non-ipsative (choosing one alternative does not exclude others) way that does not restrict the analyses to a single choice or set score of choices. Employing PTV does not restrict the ideal range of the question to a single election with only one available choice. By using the term “ever” in the question wording, the concept refers to sometime in the future to learn about today’s projected voting behaviour. Furthermore, it lessens the effects of social desirability for the voting behaviour of extreme parties and is deemed as a feasible alternative for capturing voting intentions towards the right (Johann *et al.* 2016).

In contrast to other attitude scales that are also often employed for multiple parties, such as feeling thermometers, the question wording of the PTV items is explicitly developed to measure a current state of the voter’s preferences for the single party (Tillie 1995; van der Brug *et al.* 2007; van der Eijk *et al.* 2006; van der Eijk and Marsh 2007).

For the operationalization of propensities to vote we use the standard question wording that is also included in the German Longitudinal Election Study: “*We have a number of political parties in Germany each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please answer on a scale where '0' means "not at all probable" and '10' means "very probable."*” We asked it for all major parties that gained entrance to the German parliament: Christian Democratic Party (CDU), Christian Social Party (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), Green Party, Left Party and Alternative for Germany (AfD). Because the CSU only competes in Bavaria (where the CDU does not) and always forms a parliamentary faction with the CDU, we merged the PTV for both - respondents from Bavaria got assigned the CSU score, respondents from the other states the score for the CDU.

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<sup>6</sup> The terms electoral utilities and propensities to vote are often used interchangeable, a practice which we will follow.

### 3.2.2 Operationalization of the Independent Variables

For the operationalization of party identification, we rely on the established German standard item: “*Many people in the Federal Republic lean toward a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you?*” Issue orientation is measured by the question which party is capable of solving the current most and second most important problem in Germany, ranging from 0 “party was never mentioned” to 2 “party was mentioned for the most and the second most important problem”. Candidate orientations were measured with feeling thermometers: “And what do you think of the following politicians?” on 11-point rating scales, ranging from -5 “I think nothing of this politician” to +5 “I think a lot of this politician” for the leading politician of the party, Angela Merkel (CDU), Martin Schulz (SPD), Christian Lindner (FDP), Cem Özdemir (GREENS), Sahra Wagenknecht (LEFT), and Alexander Gauland (AfD).

For the length of time spent in Germany ratio, we divide the time that has elapsed since respondents migrated to Germany in years by their age in years. The resulting ratio ranges from 0.01 to 1 (for 2nd generation migrants that lived all their life in Germany). Ethnic identity was measured as the sense of feeling as a group member for several groups on the same five-point scale (1 “does not apply at all” to 5 “totally applies”). We asked Germans of Turkish descent if they feel as Turkish and Kurdish, and Russian-Germans if they feel as Russian-German or Russian; and, if they/their parents came from another country of the USSR, if they feel as someone from there. We take the highest value for every respondent. For egotrophic *discrimination*, we first employed a filter question that asked if someone would describe themselves as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in Germany. This variable is dichotomous (1=yes, 0=no) and taps discrimination based on group membership. Afterwards, we ask how often the respondent personally experienced discrimination in six domains (such as the public sphere, work place, police, official institutions) on a 3-point rating scale: 3 “often”, 2 “sometimes” and 1 “rarely”. We calculate the mean frequency of discrimination over all six domains. The variable has the values 1 (few discrimination) to 3 (very frequent discrimination). All other immigrant participants that did not describe themselves as being part of a discriminated group were coded as 0.

Controls variables were included for age, education, gender, and political interest to account for unobserved socialization effects. Education has 3 categories: low (less than 10 years), medium (10 to 11 years) and high education (University entrance exam/Abitur). As 39 percent of participants went to school in a foreign country, we asked for the number of years they went to school, and recoded this measure accordingly to mirror the German item, so that respondents with less than 10 years of school visit were coded as 1, 10-11 years (and no university studies) were coded as 2, and more than 11 years were coded as 3. Furthermore, we control for immigrant group (1=Turkish descent, 2= post-Soviet descent). For the missing value dummies, we code all answers that are normally coded as missing, such as “Don’t know” and “Refuses” as 1, and all other answers as 0.

The distribution of independent variables for all groups can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Distribution of independent variables

	Turkish descent	Post-Soviet descent	Natives
Party identification (%)	74	68	74
Issue Orientations (Party deemed competent to solve most important problem)	78	80	76
Mean candidate evaluations over all six parties (1 to 11)	5.24	5.62	5.10
Mean Length of Stay Ratio (0 to 1)	0.86	0.51	
Discrimination Index (0 to 3)	0.41	0.17	
Mean ethnic identification (1 to 5)	3.32	3.57	

### 3.3 Data Structure and Methods of Analysis

The most common data format to analyse propensities to vote in are stacked data, meaning that we will analyse the variables for all six major party utilities at the same time. The unit for analysis is therefore no longer the respondent, but the respondent’s evaluation for a single party. For this, the data are transformed into long format. Instead of having one row per respondent with columns for the six PTV measures, we now have six rows, a single one for every PTV measure and the corresponding indicators for the party, per respondent. This approach is an established approach in electoral research, especially for the analyses of PTV’s (Oppenhuis 1995; Schmitt 2009; van der Eijk *et al.* 2006; Vries and Tillman 2011). As the sample size increases by the factor six, it is important to account for clustering on the level of the individuals, because the multiple observations per respondent are not independent of each other (Beck and Katz 1995). Hence, for our analyses we estimate multi-level linear regression models with random intercepts, with individuals as level-2 units. To avoid overly optimistic standard errors, we also calculate robust standard errors. To be able to compare coefficients across and within models, all continuous variables are coded to range from 0 to 1. For paragraph 4.4, we employ path models with robust standard errors, using Stata’s ML procedure.

Furthermore, we encounter missing values on our central variables that are higher for immigrant voters than for natives (see Table 2) and whose variance we explicitly model in our last step.

Table 2: Shares of missing values in percent for central indicators by group

	IMGES: Turkish Descent	IMGES: Post- Soviet Descent	GLES: Natives
PTV			
CDU/CSU	0.062	0.122	0.037
SPD	0.058	0.119	0.031
LEFT Party	0.077	0.145	0.035
GREENS	0.064	0.130	0.035
FDP	0.127	0.168	0.037
AfD	0.067	0.150	0.028
PID	0.078	0.109	0.033

Issue orientation	0.107	0.136	0.085
Candidate orientation			
CDU/CSU	0.031	0.046	0.012
SPD	0.124	0.223	0.062
LEFT Party	0.261	0.364	0.168
GREENS	0.115	0.368	0.110
FDP	0.359	0.471	0.153
AfD	0.375	0.472	0.211

Natives: Data from GLES, others: data from IMGES; Grouped together: don't know, no answer, don't know the party/politician; CSU for respondents from Bavaria, CDU for all other respondents.

Listwise deletion would lead to estimations that are only valid/interfering for those without missing values and would very likely result in the overestimation of the effect of independent variables. Instead, as already described in section 2.3.4., we treat these missing values as valid answers of those without political attitudes or party attachments (Rubin *et al.* 1995). We rely on Kroh's (2006) procedure for the imputation process by using multiple complete random imputation (MCRI). The goal is to keep these cases with item nonresponse, but to avoid mean substitution as this would lead significant effects hat for those with imputed values even though there is no information about their true values (see Kroh 2006 for further examples). Instead, our general procedure starts with setting a seed (8407) for reproducibility and sorting the dataset randomly.

Afterwards, we start by creating a new random variable ranging from 0 to 1 with a mean of 0.5 that is uniformly distributed. We then recode this variable according to the weighted distribution of the original variable. In a last step, we substitute for those without missing values the real values. We repeated these procedures for the independent variable propensity to vote as well as party identification, candidate evaluations, and issue competency for all six parties and three groups (natives, Turkish descent immigrants, Post-soviet immigrants) separately to account for different distributions between parties and groups. This procedure guarantees that we find no artificial relationship for imputed cases between the imputed variables and others (see Table A.12). As we can easily see, using mean substitution leads towards a highly significant relationship (Model 3b,  $b=9.31^{***}$ ) of candidate evaluations with propensities to vote for those with substituted missing values for candidate evaluations, hence these results are an artefact. Furthermore, this inflates the coefficient for the analyses of all respondents (Modell 3a,  $b=4.59^{***}$ ). Using MCRI avoids estimation of such an artificial relationship (Modell 2b,  $b=0.10$ ) for those with missing values and in general leads to a lower coefficient for the whole sample (Modell 2a,  $b=3.44^{***}$ ) when those with missing values are treated as having no opinion on these matters. Thus, we use the MCRI procedure for our study. We repeat the above described procedure five times and use Stata's MI framework to analyse the imputed data sets.

### 3.4 Immigrant Voters at the 2017 Bundestag Election

In Germany, around 6.3 million immigrant voters were eligible to vote in the last federal election (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) 2017). This represents around 10 percent of the entire electorate,

compared with 15 percent in the US. The two biggest groups of immigrants of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation (i.e. those having migrated to Germany themselves or being the children of someone who had migrated) are of Turkish (3.8 millions) and post-Soviet/Russian-German (2.8 millions) origin. Our analysis will focus on members of these two largest groups with German citizenship that make up about 40 % of all immigrant voters. The Russian Germans are late resettlers who largely descended from German-speaking emigrants to Tsarist Russia in the 18th century and “returned” in the 1980s and 1990s. The German Turks came mostly as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s or asylum-seekers in the 1980s (Goerres and Mayer *et al.* 2018). Of those two groups, about 2 million from the former Soviet Union hold German citizenship and are eligible to vote at federal elections, while 700,000 of those of Turkish descent are (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) 30.06.2017). What we know from the few available studies done so far is that Germans of post-Soviet descent showed a strong support for the Christian-Democrats while Germans of Turkish descent traditionally favoured the Social-Democrats (Sachverständigenrat Migration 2016; Wüst 2004).

Before we turn to the multidimensional perspective of looking at propensities to vote, let us look at our estimated turnout and party-list votes first. Actual turnout was 76.2 % at the election. We know from previous studies that turnout is almost always overestimated in surveys due to social desirability and lower response rates among the politically less interested (Spies *et al.* 2019). Thus, turnout in the German Election Study GLES is about 88 %, and therefore almost 12 percentage points higher. With keeping this bias in mind, we now look at the turnout for immigrant voters: about 74 % of voters of Turkish descent and about 67 % of voters from the former Soviet Union report to have voted. These numbers are a far cry from the 76.2 % actual turnout at the election. Even though the point estimates are different between the two groups, the difference is statistically not different from one another.

Table 3 shows the estimates for the party-list votes for both groups of immigrant voters as well as the official returns. As we already mentioned in the introduction, Germans of Turkish descent are left of the overall results with the SPD (35), the Greens (13) and the Left (16) scoring two thirds of their vote. Russian Germans are right of the overall results with CDU/CSU (27), FDP (12), AfD (15) reaching a majority plus a substantial proportion of votes for the Left (21).

Table 3: Estimated party-list vote shares of immigrant voters, all voters and the final results at the 2017 Bundestag election

	Turkish Descent	Post- Soviet Descent	Official returns, whole population
Second vote, federal election 2017			
CDU/CSU	20	27	33.0
SPD	35	12	20.5
LEFT Party	16	21	9.2
GREENS	13	8	8.9
FDP	4	12	10.7
AfD	0	15	12.6
Others	12	5	5.1
n	275	301	

Let us now move to propensities to vote. Table 4 lists the estimated means for each immigrant group, for immigrant voters as a whole and for native voters. Recall that this is the mean number indicated on a scale from 0 to 10 as to the likelihood of ever voting for that party. It can also be interpreted as the vote potential of that party among that group. Glancing across the numbers of the first row, we find that the CDU/CSU did not fare that differently across these groups. It is interesting to note that the CDU/CSU propensity to be voted for among the Turkish community stands at 5.0, only slightly below the 5.5 of native voters and 5.3 of German re-settlers. If we recall that the CDU/CSU was only voted for by 20 percent among those of Turkish descent, this means that the CDU/CSU did comparatively bad given the potential to be voted for in that community. We see an analogous picture for the SPD among Russian German. The mean propensity to be voted for was 5.0 compared to only 5.6 among the natives and 6.3 among those of Turkish descent. Yet, only 12 % voted for them. It seems that both large parties have more potential in their “weaker” immigrant group, but failed to materialise it.

Table 4: Propensities to vote for immigrant and native voters at the 2017 Bundestag election

	Turkish Descent	Post-Soviet Descent	All immigrants	Natives
CDU/CSU	5.0	5.3	5.2	5.5
SPD	6.3	5.0	5.6	5.6
LINKE	4.6	4.3	4.4	3.4
GREENS	4.6	3.7	4.1	4.4
FDP	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.2
AfD	0.5	2.7	1.7	1.3

Natives: Excluding all 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants

## 4 Empirical Analyses

### 4.1 The Michigan Model Performs Well Both among Immigrant and Native Voters

Let us now turn towards multi-level regression estimates. Remember that we now have stacked propensities to vote as the dependent variable, so that each observation is an attributed utility level by a voter for a party. Table 5 displays one regression model in two variants: the Michigan model with party identification, candidate evaluation and issue orientation for the respective party, including the controls age, gender, and education. It is estimated once for both immigrant groups (with immigrant group as dummy; separate models by immigrant group can be found in the appendix Table A. 13) and once for natives. We assumed in H1 that the three determinants of the Michigan model have the same direction of impact for both groups – and indeed, they do. All point estimates and their significant tests work in the same direction across all models as expected. In addition, this holds true for the controls as well, except for education, as having higher formal education positively and significantly affects the level of party preferences for native in general (making higher educated people more likely to vote for any of

the parties on average) but not for immigrant voters. In general, party preferences are lower for the Post-soviet than the Turkish group, but this difference is not significant. Our results show in principle that the Michigan model works for each group: Party identification, candidate evaluation and issue orientation have positive and significant coefficients. In sum, this is an important finding. It means that the inter-individual differences as to party preferences between immigrant voters in Germany can be explained by the same standard models that we can apply to native voters.<sup>7</sup>

Table 5: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote for immigrant and native voters at the 2017 Bundestag election, unstandardized coefficients

	Model 1: Immigrants	Model 2: Natives
Party identification	2.37*** (0.26)	3.42*** (0.11)
Issue orientations	1.82*** (0.32)	0.66*** (0.12)
Candidate evaluations	3.40*** (0.25)	5.14*** (0.15)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age	-0.72* (0.31)	-1.04*** (0.17)
Gender: male	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.06)
Education	0.25 (0.14)	0.59*** (0.10)
Political Interest	0.14 (0.20)	0.18 (0.15)
Post-Soviet descent (base: Turkish)	-0.04 (0.11)	
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)		
SPD	1.08*** (0.21)	0.91*** (0.10)
LEFT Party	-0.07 (0.21)	-0.86*** (0.11)
GREENS	0.23 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.10)
FDP	-0.11 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.09)
AfD	-1.53*** (0.23)	-0.84*** (0.13)
Constant	2.06*** (0.28)	1.15*** (0.17)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.83*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.01)
N	5412	10308
Mean AIC	26040	44915
Mean BIC	26146	45023

<sup>7</sup> We also estimated separate models for the two migrant groups (see appendix, Table A. 13) that show that the results hold true for both migrant groups, so grouping them together does not blur differences between the two groups.

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with  $m=5$ ; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$

However, the importance of the factors varies between immigrants and natives (see Figure 1): party identification and candidate evaluations are less important for immigrant voters and issue evaluations are more important, compared to native voters.




Figure 1: Coefficient plots for the Michigan model immigrants vs natives, unstandardized coefficients, Coefficients based on Table 3

Table 6, Column 1 reveals systematic comparisons of the respective regression coefficients in a complex interaction analysis (details in the appendix Table A. 14). We find support for H2 in that the effect of party identification is smaller for immigrants than for natives. The estimated coefficient for immigrants is about 1.1 PTV points lower than for natives. The causal lever that takes longer to take effect and to channel new information has a smaller impact among immigrant voters, those individuals whose socialization experience was less contextualized by a homogenous stable environment. Candidate evaluations also have a lower effect among immigrants (-1.23\*\*\* PTV points), which we did not expect in H2. It could be (a) that the impact of candidate evaluations on PTV is lower because these orientations do not matter as much as for natives or (b) that these attitudes do not exist at all. If we repeat the analyses without those respondents with missing values for candidate orientations (see Table 6, Column 2), we see that the difference between both groups decreases but is still negative and highly significant (-0.78\*\*\*). This actually adds support to both ways of explanation. Table 6 also suggests that issue

orientation, the most short-termed variable, has a stronger effect among immigrants, a finding that fits the overall picture quite nicely.<sup>8</sup>

Table 6: Tests of comparison on regression coefficients

	(1) Immigrants vs Natives, all respondents	(2) Immigrants vs Natives, w/o MV for candidates
Party identification	-1.10*** (0.27)	-1.16*** (0.27)
Candidate evaluations	-1.23*** (0.25)	-0.78** (0.24)
Issue orientations	1.09** (0.34)	1.01** (0.30)

\*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$ . Full table, see Table A. 14

## 4.2 No Significant Direct Effects of Immigrant-specific Factors

Next, we include the three immigrant-specific factors in the standard model we used under paragraph 4.1. We expect a positive relationship between party preferences and increasing length of stay in Germany as well as decreasing levels of perceived discrimination and ethnic identity. However, the results displayed in Table 7 show clearly that immigrant-specific factors do not have a significant direct relationship with propensities to vote at all. Not even in the baseline model M1b do these factors affect party preferences significantly.<sup>9</sup> H3 must thus be rejected.

In addition, we hypothesized that discrimination might affect the relationship between ethnic identity and party preferences as a moderator, i.e. the more one feels discriminated, the stronger and the more positive should ethnic identity affect party preferences. However, we cannot observe such a relationship from our results, neither for the subgroups nor the combined analyses of both immigrant groups.

Table 7: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with direct immigrant-specific factors, unstandardized coefficients, reduced table

	M1	M1b (baseline model)	M2 (with interaction)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>			
Share Time in Germany	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.34)
Ethnic Identity	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)

<sup>8</sup> When we look at both groups separately, we see that the general pattern can be found in both groups, with voters of Turkish descent being more similar to natives than Post-soviet voters – hence coefficient differences with the natives are only significant for party identification in the Turkish group. Thus, H2 finds only mixed evidence.

<sup>9</sup> This holds true, but for one exception, when we analyse the groups separately (see Table A. 17): In the baseline model, discrimination has a negative relationship with party preferences in the Turkish group ( $p < 0.05$ ) – however, this significant effect disappears when the full model is analysed.

Discrimination Index	0.02	0.04	0.19
	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.25)
Discrimination Index *			-0.04
Ethnic Identity			(0.06)

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with  $m=5$ ; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$ , Also included all variables displayed in Table 4; Full table, see Full Estimates for Testing Hypotheses 3&4  
Table A. 16

Last, we analysed if the three immigrant-specific factors significantly improve the fit of the model in predicting the dependent variable with direct effects. However, running a Wald test ( $F(3,563)=0.51$ ,  $p = 0.678$ ) tells us that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, meaning the three immigrant-specific factors are not a statistically significant improvement for the fit of the model. H4 must thus be rejected as well. In general, we find no direct effect of immigrant-specific factors on party preferences, even if we only estimate a baseline model. Hence, we turn over to analyse the role of these factors as moderators for party identification.

### 4.3 How Immigrant-specific Moderate the Effect of Party Identification on Propensities-to-Vote

For the analyses of the moderating effects of the immigrant-specific factors, we estimate four multi-level linear regression models (see Table 8 for a shortened version, appendix Table A. 18 for the full table). We assumed in H5 that the length of stay in Germany and ethnic identity moderate party identification in a positive way, whereas discrimination leads to a feeling of dissatisfaction with one's own party and thus moderates the effect of party identification negatively.

Table 8: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with immigrant-specific factors as moderators for party identification, unstandardized coefficients, only immigrant voters

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Party identification	1.29*	2.52***	2.49***	1.25
	(0.64)	(0.62)	(0.28)	(0.83)
Candidate evaluations	3.38***	3.40***	3.41***	3.39***
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Issue orientations	1.78***	1.81***	1.80***	1.77***
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>				
Share Time in Germany	-0.31			-0.37
	(0.35)			(0.36)
Share Time in Germany * Party ID	1.61			1.72*
	(0.84)			(0.81)
Ethnic Identity		-0.04		-0.05
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Ethnic Identity * Party ID		-0.04		0.03
		(0.16)		(0.15)
Discrimination Index			0.06	0.08

	(0.09)	(0.09)
Discrimination Index * Party ID	-0.45	-0.51
	(0.33)	(0.30)

*Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with  $m=5$ ; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$ , Full table, see*

Table A. 18)

In M1-M3, we analysed only one interaction separately. Here, we find no significant interaction between the immigrant-specific factor and party identification. However, it is important to note that the product term of party identification and length of stay in Germany is almost significant on the 5% level ( $p=0.054$ ). When we include all three interactions in M4, this product term reaches a conventional level of significance. Party identification no longer has a significant marginal when length of stay in Germany is equal to zero; if we recode the variable to more meaningful values such as the mean of the time ratio spent in Germany (0.6667) and the maximum (1), party identification has a positive relationship with party preferences ( $p < 0.001$ ). The product of party identification and time ratio spent in Germany is positively related with party preferences: The more lifetime voters spent in Germany, the more important party identification is for predicting party preferences.

If we look at the separate analyses by group (see Table A. 19), we learn that this product term is only significant for Post-soviet voters but not for immigrant voters of Turkish descent. We could assume that this effect is mainly caused by different levels of party identification, i.e. the longer one stays in a country, the more likely they are to feel attached to a political party. However, analysing the bivariate correlation between party identification and time spent in Germany shows a negative, small correlation that is only significant for the Turkish group ( $r=-0.11^*$ ), but not for the Post-soviet group ( $r=-0.08$ ,  $p=0.68$ ). We assume that the effect of party identification for party preferences increases for immigrant voters the longer they stay in Germany. Figure 2 shows that the effect size of party identification indeed increases with time spent in Germany; whereas identifying with a party increases party preferences by 1.3 PTV points for voters that spent 10% of their lives in Germany, this almost triples (3.1 PTV points) for immigrant voters that spent all their lives in Germany.

H5 can be partly supported, as length of stay has a positive effect on the relationship between party identification and party preferences. However, no such effect can be found for ethnic identity and discrimination.






Figure 2: Predicted values for party preferences for partisans and non-partisans, depending on time spent in Germany, weighted data, Model M8 ( $m=1$ ) from Table 8.





#### 4.4 Immigrant-Specific Factors Predict “Don’t Knows” in Attitudes at the Heart of the Michigan Model

Lastly, we analyse the possibility that immigrant-specific attitudes neither have direct, nor moderating effects, but that they affect the prerequisites of the Michigan model – the existence of political attitudes and attachments. For these analyses, we employ path models with a maximum-likelihood estimator. Figure 3 displays the basic model we use: the variables age, education, gender and political interest affect party identification. Party identification itself has a direct effect as well as two indirect effects, through candidate and issue orientations, on party preferences. The two short-term factors correlate with each other and also have a direct effect on propensities to vote. Last, propensities to vote themselves are affected by migrant group and the respective party (stack). We also include four dummy variables for missing values – these variables have the value 1 if the respondent did not answer the question and 0 if they did. We now analyse how immigrant-specific factors affect these missing value dummy variables (see Figure 4). This allows us a thorough analysis of the effects of length of stay, ethnic identity, and perceived discrimination – it could be that these variables neither add additional explanatory power, nor affect how the model works, but that they affect the heart of the Michigan model itself – the existence of such attitudes and attachments.




Figure 3: Path diagram with missing value dummies (light grey)




Figure 4: Path diagram with missing value dummies (light grey) and immigrant-specific factor (dark grey)

We now turn to the results of these analyses (see Table 9). The models M1-M3 only include one immigrant-specific factor each, whereas M4 allows a multivariate comparison of all three factors. We also run separate models for both migrant groups (M4a and M4b). We assumed in H6 that length of stay has a negative relationship with missing values for the core variables of the Michigan model – and indeed, our results support this view: in the combined analyses, we find three negative, significant paths on missing values for the Michigan factors.

Looking at the groups separately, we find such a result also in four out of six cases (M4 and M4b). The other two times, solely for the Turkish group, the path is positive, but not significant. We also hypothesized that ethnic identification has a positive relationship with missing values – the more one feels as being part of one’s own ethnic group, the more likely someone is to not have acquired political attitudes. Indeed, ethnic identity has a positive path to missing values for the short-term factors, candidate evaluations and issue orientations.<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, we look at the effect of discrimination. Here, our results are mixed and not in line with our hypothesis: only the path on missingness on candidate evaluations is significant, but negative – the more one feels discriminated against, the more likely they are to have attitudes other than “don’t know” towards candidates.<sup>11</sup> We thus conclude that H6 can be partly accepted for length of stay and ethnic identity, but not for discrimination. Furthermore, we see differences between the two groups when it comes to party identification: Whereas ethnic identity and discrimination positively relate to not being

<sup>10</sup> Additionally, for the subgroup analysis, in four of six cases, ethnic identity has a positive, significant path with missing values. The exception, again, is the path on missing values on candidates (n.s.) and missing values on party ID ( $p < 0.01$ ) for the Turkish group. We also see contrary effects for the Turkish and Post-soviet group for party identification: Whereas ethnic identity leads towards having a party identification for Turkish immigrants, it’s the opposite for the post-Soviet group. This finding is not surprising given the very different meaning of ethnicity among these two groups.

<sup>11</sup> For the separate groups, discrimination only has a positive effect on missing values (Party ID and the Post-soviet group) in one out of six cases – the other times, the effect is negative – meaning that discrimination has a mobilizing relationship with the existence of attitudes and attachments.

able to answer the question for the identification party for Russian-Germans, it seems to mobilize attitudes towards parties for Turkish immigrants.

Table 9: Results from path models with immigrant-specific factors affecting missing value dummies, unstandardized logits, only immigrant voters

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M4a Only Turkish	M4b Only Post- soviet
<b>MV Party ID (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.14*** (0.02)			-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Ethnic identity		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
Constant	0.18 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.09 (0.01)	0.23 (0.04)	0.34 (0.09)	0.11 (0.03)
<b>MV Candidates (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.25*** (0.04)			-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.31*** (0.06)
Ethnic identity		0.02* (0.01)		0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Constant	0.44 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.29 (0.01)	0.37 (0.05)	0.26 (0.10)	0.38 (0.05)
<b>MV Issues (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.26*** (0.04)			-0.24*** (0.04)	0.13 (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.05)
Ethnic identity		0.04*** (0.01)		0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.45 (0.03)	0.15 (0.03)	0.28 (0.01)	0.33 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.47 (0.05)

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with  $m=5$ ; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$ , Full table, see Table A. 20.

Summing up the results (see Table 10), we see that we found the Michigan model to work the same for immigrant voters as for natives, with the slight variation that party identification is more important for the party preferences of native voters whereas issue orientations matter more for immigrant voters. When we turn to immigrant-specific factors, we find neither a direct effect on party preferences, nor an interaction between discrimination and ethnic identity: immigrant-specific factors do not add explanatory power to the standard model itself. However, one of the immigrant-specific factors amplifies the positive effect of party identification on party preferences. We also find partly confirmation for the immigrant-specific factors importance for the existence of political attitudes – length of stay positively and ethnic identity negatively affect the foundations of the Michigan model at

the core – immigrant voters’ possession of attitudes and attachments is influenced by these variables. Immigrant factors are thus relevant at the margins of the Michigan Model rather than at the Core.

Table 10: Results from path models with immigrant-specific factors affecting missing value dummies, unstandardized logits, only immigrant voters

Hypotheses	Description	Result
H1	Same direction of effects for natives and immigrant voters	Yes
H2	Party ID stronger effect for natives, candidate evaluations and issue orientations stronger effect for immigrant voters	Partly: Party ID & Issue orientations: yes Candidate evaluations: no
H3	Direct effect of immigrant-specific factors	no
H4	Discrimination counteracts the negative effect of ethnic identity	no
H5	Immigrant-specific factors moderate functioning of party ID	Partly: Length of stay: yes Ethnic identity & discrimination: no
H6	Immigrant-specific factors affect existence of political attitudes	Partly: Length of stay & ethnic identity: yes Discrimination: no (significant, but direction opposite than assumed)

## 5 Conclusions

We analysed the voting behaviour of German citizens who were first or second generation from Turkey and the former Soviet Union and contrasted the patterns with native voters. Our findings show that the Michigan model can be successfully applied to the explanation of immigrants’ party preferences. This supports the results from Sanders *et al.* (2014), who could show the applicability of both models for immigrants in the United Kingdom, as well as earlier approaches for Germany (Wüst 2002). However, the importance of the factors varies between immigrants and natives: Party identification and candidate evaluations are significantly less important for immigrants, whereas issue evaluations are more important. We also analysed three different ways in which immigrant-specific factors, namely length of stay, ethnic identity, and perceived discrimination, may affect party preferences.

However, some previous findings for the impact of immigrant-specific variables that additionally shape voting among immigrants could not be confirmed by our study (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010; La Garza and Cortina 2007; Sanders *et al.* 2014). We found no significant additional effect of immigrant-specific variables on party preferences, meaning that the standard model itself seems sufficiently able to explain party preferences. We also found only partly support for a possible moderating effect of length of stay, ethnic identity, and discrimination on party identification – only length of stay significantly moderates the relationship between party identification and propensities to vote by amplifying the effect. Lastly, we analysed the importance of such factors for the existence of political attitudes in general. And indeed, here we found length of stay to increase and ethnic identity to decrease the existence of such

attitudes in the first place. We also found significant effects of discrimination, but not in the proposed direction: the more one feels discriminated against, the more likely they are to have attitudes towards candidates. Whereas ethnic identity and discrimination positively relates to not being able to answer the question for the identification party for Russian-Germans, it seems to mobilize attitudes towards parties for Turkish immigrants.

Our article is the first to analyse the effect of immigrant-specific variables on the existence of attitudes and shows the potential for further analyses. As our study shows, these variables have the most impact at the level of existence, hence other studies, that only analyse direct/moderating effects, miss the picture because the main differences occur at the level of having attitudes and not at the level of the attitudes themselves.

## 6 Appendix

### 6.1 The Design of the Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES)

For the IMGES study, a two-step sampling procedure was employed. First, 150 sample points were drawn with the probability proportional to their sizes from all municipalities in Germany. Next, 1,400 people aged 16 and above's addresses were randomly selected from a local register. Onomastic classification procedures were employed on the first and last names of the selected persons to determine if a person is likely to be of Turkish or post-Soviet descent. Onomastic classification has been used several times before for the sampling of minorities and provides a feasible approach (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Kruse and Dollmann 2017; Schnell *et al.* 2017). Persons with a high likelihood of belonging to one of the two immigrant groups were then contacted by interviewers for computer-assisted personal interviews in German. In addition, respondents could also participate in Russian or Turkish if the interviewers found their language skills to be lacking for an interview in German. Mean survey time was 75 minutes. For further information, see Goerres and Spies *et al.* (2018).

### 6.2 Validation for PTVs for our data set

Several previous studies (Lachat 2011; van der Eijk *et al.* 2006; van der Eijk and Marsh 2007) could already show that propensities to vote are valid measures of voting intentions as they correlate strongly with respondents' discrete vote choice: van der Eijk *et al.* (2006) report that on average, 93 percent of Dutch voters of a party gave it the highest utility, and Lachat (2011) shows similar shares for Switzerland.

However, this validation has not been done for immigrant voters, so we first show how vote choice and the highest probability to vote for a party correspond for a conceptual validation (see Table 11). Contrary to previous shares of correctly classified cases that ranged between 88-93 percent, our shares

of correctly classified cases are lower at a mean of 76 percent. However, this validation is for a specific sub-group in a country where tactical voting is rather high. If we also rely on 2<sup>nd</sup> highest utilities, shares, except for the FDP, reach value ranges like in previous studies.

Furthermore, turnout was only about 70 percent (N=633 out of 947). In addition, 11 percent of all respondents that reported turnout did not want to indicate their vote choice (N=69). This means that we only have valid values for 60.4 percent of respondents (N=576) and lost about 40 percent of cases. Contrary, only 9.3 percent (N=88) did not indicate any valid values for the six propensity to vote scales. We conclude that propensities to vote are a valid measure for analysing voting behaviour. We find slight differences between the two groups, with 89 percent of Germans of Turkish descent and 82 percent of Germans of post-Soviet descent correctly classified by 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> highest probabilities to vote. Maximum value for propensity to vote and turnout are moderately and positively correlated ( $r=.29$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

*Table 11: Distribution and correctly classified choice (1st and 2nd party preference) for all parties among immigrant voters*

	Vote choice at federal election (2 <sup>nd</sup> choice)	N	Correctly classified by highest probability to vote	Correctly classified by highest and 2 <sup>nd</sup> highest probability to vote
CDU/CSU	25.4	130	86	86
SPD	24.9	128	75	87
LEFT PARTY	20.4	105	87	96
GREENS	11.5	59	72	91
FDP	9.2	48	38	67
AfD	8.7	45	70	90
Total	100	515	76	86

### 6.3 Descriptive Graphs of the Propensities-to-Vote




Figure 5: Boxplots for propensities to vote by party




Figure 6: Histograms for the propensity to vote over all six analysed parties (stacked data) by group

## 6.4 Multivariate Models of Propensities to Votes

Table A.12: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote for immigrant voters: Comparing different ways of treating missing values for the IMGES sample

	M1: Listwise deletion for MV for Candidate Evaluations	M2a: MCRI, all respondents	M2b: MCRI, only respondents with MV for Candidate Evaluations	M3a: Mean substitution, all respondents	M3b: Mean substitution, only respondents with MV for Candidate Evaluations
Party identification	2.18*** (0.26)	2.53*** (0.26)	2.62** (0.67)	2.17*** (0.23)	2.84*** (0.49)
Issue orientation	1.53*** (0.26)	1.86*** (0.25)	1.88** (0.61)	2.22*** (0.24)	2.93*** (0.83)
Candidate evaluation	4.80*** (0.23)	3.44*** (0.22)	0.10 (0.45)	4.59*** (0.21)	9.31*** (2.11)
Age	-1.30* (0.52)	-1.30** (0.42)	-1.12 (0.67)	-0.62* (0.31)	-0.34 (0.49)
Gender: male	0.15 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.37* (0.15)
Education	0.34* (0.17)	0.43** (0.16)	0.02 (0.25)	0.27* (0.12)	0.00 (0.19)
Political Interest	0.76** (0.28)	1.20*** (0.24)	1.14** (0.42)	0.24 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.31)
Post-Soviet Descent (Base: Turkish)	-0.32* (0.16)	-0.38** (0.14)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.82** (0.30)
Generation (base: 2nd)					
1.5th	0.42* (0.18)	0.51** (0.18)	0.18 (0.33)	0.26 (0.15)	0.12 (0.25)
1st	0.14 (0.22)	0.19 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.35)	0.11 (0.17)	0.41 (0.25)
Constant	0.61* (0.28)	0.86** (0.27)	1.76** (0.58)	1.07*** (0.24)	-1.87 (1.20)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.70*** (0.03)	0.77*** (0.02)	0.67*** (0.06)	0.66*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.06)
N	4028	5406	1378	5406	1378
AIC	.	.	.	24222	6168
BIC	.	.	.	24341	6262

Omitted in Table: Stack; Weighted data; M2a and M2b: MCRI as described above, M3a and M3b: mean replacement for missing values with group mean (Turkish and Post-Soviet), Stacked data;

\*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$

## 6.4.1 Full Estimates for Testing Hypothesis 1

Table A. 13: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote for immigrant voters by group at the 2017 Bundestag election

	Turkish descent	Post-Soviet descent
Party identification	2.47*** (0.37)	2.14*** (0.30)
Issue orientations	1.31* (0.48)	2.16*** (0.34)
Candidate evaluations	3.70*** (0.37)	2.99*** (0.36)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age	0.00 (0.48)	-1.02* (0.41)
Gender: male	0.21 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)
Education	0.61** (0.20)	-0.07 (0.18)
Political Interest	-0.06 (0.31)	0.31 (0.29)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)		
SPD	1.62*** (0.34)	0.53* (0.25)
LEFT Party	0.51 (0.31)	-0.61* (0.29)
GREENS	1.05** (0.36)	-0.60* (0.29)
FDP	0.29 (0.34)	-0.54* (0.26)
AfD	-1.60*** (0.35)	-1.56*** (0.29)
Constant	1.21** (0.42)	2.94*** (0.40)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.89*** (0.03)
N	2592	2820
Mean AIC	11708	14139
Mean BIC	11796	14228

\*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*:  $p < 0.05$




Figure 7: Coefficient plots for the Michigan model immigrant groups vs natives, unstandardized coefficients

## 6.4.2 Full Estimates for Testing Hypothesis 2

Table A. 14: Multi-level linear regression with interaction effects between natives and immigrants

	Michigan-Model, all respondents	Michigan-Model, w/o MV for candidates
Party identification	3.44*** (0.11)	3.15*** (0.10)
Candidate evaluations	0.71*** (0.12)	0.61*** (0.12)
Issue orientations	4.93*** (0.14)	5.71*** (0.13)
Controls		
Age	-1.02*** (0.16)	-1.08*** (0.17)
Gender: male	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
Education	0.45*** (0.08)	0.47*** (0.09)
Political Interest	0.20 (0.14)	0.07 (0.15)
Group (ref. cat. Natives)		
Immigrants	0.58*** (0.15)	0.34* (0.16)
Interaction effects		
Migrants * Party ID	-1.10*** (0.27)	-1.16*** (0.27)
Migrants * Candidate evaluations	-1.23***	-0.78**

	(0.25)	(0.24)
Migrants * Issue orientation	1.09**	1.01**
	(0.34)	(0.30)
<b>Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)</b>		
SPD	0.98***	1.07***
	(0.10)	(0.09)
LEFT Party	-0.58***	-0.57***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
GREENS	0.03	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)
FDP	-0.09	-0.00
	(0.10)	(0.09)
AfD	-1.11***	-0.82***
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Constant	1.27***	0.95***
	(0.16)	(0.17)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.31***	-0.32***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.85***	0.79***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	15720	13375
Mean AIC	71303	57954
Mean BIC	71456	58104

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05

Table A. 15: Interactions between different groups for combined model

	Michigan-Model, all respondents
Party identification	3.44*** (0.11)
Candidate evaluations	0.71*** (0.12)
Issue orientations	4.93*** (0.14)
<i>Controls</i>	
Age	-1.02*** (0.16)
Gender: male	-0.04 (0.06)
Education	0.45*** (0.08)
Political Interest	0.20 (0.14)
Group (ref. cat. Natives)	
Turkish group	0.38* (0.17)
Post-soviet group	0.86*** (0.21)
<i>Interaction effects</i>	
Migrants * Party ID (base: natives)	
Turkish group	-0.98* (0.40)
Post-soviet group	-1.20*** (0.31)
Migrants * Candidate evaluations (base: natives)	
Turkish group	-0.55 (0.33)
Post-soviet group	-1.85*** (0.37)
Migrants * Issue orientation (base: natives)	
Turkish group	0.44 (0.56)
Post-soviet group	1.57*** (0.35)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)	
SPD	0.97*** (0.10)
LEFT Party	-0.57*** (0.11)
GREENS	0.03 (0.11)
FDP	-0.09 (0.10)
AfD	-1.10*** (0.11)
Constant	1.27*** (0.16)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.31*** (0.05)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.85*** (0.01)
N	15720
Mean AIC	71303

Mean BIC	71456
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Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05

### 6.4.3 Full Estimates for Testing Hypotheses 3&4

Table A. 16: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with direct immigrant-specific factors, unstandardized coefficients, only immigrant voters, full model

	M1	M1b (Baseline model)	M2 (with interaction)
Party identification	1.82*** (0.32)		1.82*** (0.32)
Candidate evaluations	3.40*** (0.25)		3.40*** (0.25)
Issue orientations	2.37*** (0.26)		2.37*** (0.26)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>			
Share Time in Germany	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.34)
Ethnic Identity	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Discrimination Index	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.21)	0.19 (0.25)
Discrimination Index * Ethnic Identity			-0.04 (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	-0.87* (0.39)		-0.88* (0.39)
Gender: male	-0.01 (0.11)		-0.01 (0.11)
Education	0.24 (0.14)		0.24 (0.14)
Political Interest	0.14 (0.20)		0.14 (0.20)
Post-Soviet Descent	-0.08 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.16)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)			
SPD	1.08*** (0.21)	0.32 (0.24)	1.08*** (0.21)
LEFT Party	-0.07 (0.21)	-0.80** (0.27)	-0.07 (0.21)
GREENS	0.22 (0.25)	-0.97*** (0.29)	0.23 (0.25)
FDP	-0.11 (0.22)	-1.35*** (0.22)	-0.11 (0.22)
AfD	-1.53*** (0.23)	-3.78*** (0.26)	-1.53*** (0.23)
Constant	2.43*** (0.48)	5.46*** (0.28)	2.38*** (0.49)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.83*** (0.02)	1.02*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)

N	5412	5412	5412
Mean AIC	23525	23527	28050
Mean BIC	23649	23657	28123

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05

Table A. 17: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with direct immigrant-specific factors, unstandardized coefficients, only immigrant voters

	M1		M1b (Baseline model)		M2 (with interaction)	
	Turkish descent	Post-soviet descent	Turkish descent	Post-soviet descent	Turkish descent	Post-soviet descent
Party identification	1.31* (0.48)	2.16*** (0.34)			1.31* (0.48)	2.16*** (0.34)
Candidate evaluations	3.68*** (0.37)	2.99*** (0.36)			3.68*** (0.37)	2.99*** (0.36)
Issue orientations	2.47*** (0.37)	2.14*** (0.30)			2.47*** (0.37)	2.14*** (0.30)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>						
Share Time in Germany	-0.36 (0.44)	0.04 (0.47)	-0.49 (0.39)	0.37 (0.36)	-0.34 (0.44)	0.04 (0.47)
Ethnic Identity	0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
Discrimination Index	-0.07 (0.09)	0.22 (0.16)	-0.25* (0.11)	0.20 (0.18)	0.21 (0.34)	0.25 (0.34)
Discrimination Index * Ethnic Identity					-0.07 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age	-0.21 (0.56)	-1.03 (0.52)			-0.21 (0.55)	-1.03* (0.52)
Gender: male	0.22 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)			0.21 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)
Education	0.63** (0.20)	-0.09 (0.18)			0.64** (0.20)	-0.09 (0.18)
Political Interest	-0.04 (0.31)	0.29 (0.29)			-0.04 (0.30)	0.29 (0.29)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)						
SPD	1.61*** (0.34)	0.53* (0.25)	1.23** (0.42)	-0.55* (0.24)	1.61*** (0.34)	0.53* (0.25)
LEFT Party	0.51 (0.31)	-0.61* (0.29)	-0.29 (0.44)	-1.27*** (0.34)	0.51 (0.31)	-0.61* (0.29)
GREENS	1.05** (0.36)	-0.60* (0.29)	0.10 (0.48)	-1.94*** (0.31)	1.05** (0.36)	-0.60* (0.29)
FDP	0.29 (0.34)	-0.54* (0.26)	-1.02** (0.36)	-1.65*** (0.27)	0.29 (0.34)	-0.54* (0.26)
AfD	-1.61*** (0.35)	-1.56*** (0.29)	-4.46*** (0.38)	-3.20*** (0.36)	-1.61*** (0.35)	-1.56*** (0.29)
Constant	1.51* (0.71)	3.17*** (0.55)	5.45*** (0.53)	5.66*** (0.36)	1.38 (0.71)	3.17*** (0.55)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)
Variance (Level1 Error)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.89*** (0.03)	0.95*** (0.03)	1.04*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.89*** (0.03)
N	2592	2820	2592	2820	2592	2820
Mean AIC	14139	14139	14980	14980	14141	14141
Mean BIC	14246	14246	15045	15045	14254	14254

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05

#### 6.4.4 Full Estimates for Testing Hypothesis 5

Table A. 18: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with immigrant-specific factors as moderators for party identification, unstandardized coefficients, only immigrant voters

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Party identification	1.29* (0.64)	2.52*** (0.62)	2.49*** (0.28)	1.25 (0.83)
Candidate evaluations	3.38*** (0.24)	3.40*** (0.25)	3.41*** (0.24)	3.39*** (0.24)
Issue orientations	1.78*** (0.32)	1.81*** (0.32)	1.80*** (0.32)	1.77*** (0.32)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>				
Share Time in Germany	-0.31 (0.35)			-0.37 (0.36)
Share Time in Germany * Party ID	1.61 (0.84)			1.72* (0.81)
Ethnic Identity		-0.04 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.05)
Ethnic Identity * Party ID		-0.04 (0.16)		0.03 (0.15)
Discrimination Index			0.06 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)
Discrimination Index * Party ID			-0.45 (0.33)	-0.51 (0.30)
<i>Controls</i>				
Age	-0.79* (0.38)	-0.75* (0.31)	-0.72* (0.31)	-0.85* (0.39)
Gender: male	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)
Education	0.25 (0.14)	0.24 (0.14)	0.24 (0.14)	0.24 (0.14)
Political Interest	0.15 (0.20)	0.13 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.16)
SPD				
LEFT Party	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.06 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.21)
GREENS	0.16 (0.25)	0.23 (0.25)	0.25 (0.25)	0.18 (0.25)
FDP	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.22)	-0.15 (0.22)
AfD	-1.57*** (0.22)	-1.53*** (0.23)	-1.51*** (0.23)	-1.55*** (0.22)
Constant	2.37*** (0.43)	2.22*** (0.34)	2.03*** (0.29)	2.58*** (0.50)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07

Variance (Level1 Error)	(0.06) 0.83*** (0.02)	(0.06) 0.83*** (0.02)	(0.06) 0.83*** (0.02)	(0.06) 0.83*** (0.02)
N	5412	5412	5412	5412
Mean AIC				
Mean BIC				


Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05

Table A. 19: Multi-level linear regression on propensities to vote, with immigrant-specific factors as moderators for party identification, unstandardized coefficients, only immigrant voters, by migrant group

	<b>M4</b> <b>Turkish descent</b>	<b>M4</b> <b>Post-Soviet descent</b>
Party identification	2.16 (1.46)	0.68 (0.98)
Candidate evaluations	3.68*** (0.37)	3.00*** (0.35)
Issue orientations	1.31* (0.48)	2.03*** (0.32)
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>		
Share Time in Germany	-0.42 (0.46)	-0.31 (0.50)
Share Time in Germany * Party ID	0.55 (1.05)	3.20** (1.02)
Ethnic Identity	0.03 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
Ethnic Identity * Party ID	-0.02 (0.24)	0.00 (0.22)
Discrimination Index	-0.04 (0.10)	0.29 (0.17)
Discrimination Index * Party ID	-0.26 (0.24)	-0.75 (0.56)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age	-0.20 (0.56)	-1.01 (0.52)
Gender: male	0.22 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.15)
Education	0.63** (0.20)	-0.10 (0.18)
Political Interest	-0.04 (0.31)	0.28 (0.29)
Controlling for Party (Reference cat.: CDU/CSU)		
SPD	1.62*** (0.34)	0.50* (0.25)
LEFT Party	0.51 (0.31)	-0.62* (0.28)
GREENS	1.05** (0.36)	-0.64* (0.28)
FDP	0.29 (0.34)	-0.57* (0.26)
AfD	-1.61*** (0.35)	-1.57*** (0.29)
Constant	1.54* (0.72)	3.36*** (0.59)
Variance (Level2 Random Intercept)	-0.10	-0.10

Variance (Level1 Error)	(0.08) 0.73***	(0.09) 0.88***
N	2592	2820
Mean AIC		
Mean BIC		

Weighted and stacked data, robust standard errors in parentheses, mean coefficients after multiple imputation analyses with m=5; all continuous independent variables recoded to range from 0 to 1. \*\*\*: p < 0.001; \*\*: p < 0.01; \*: p < 0.05



## 6.4.5 Full Estimates for Testing Hypothesis 6

Table A. 20: Results from path models with immigrant-specific factors affecting missing value dummies, unstandardized logits and regression coefficients, only immigrant voters

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M4a Only Turkish	M4b Only Post- soviet
<b>MV Party ID (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.14*** (0.02)			-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Ethnic identity		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
Constant	0.18 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.09 (0.01)	0.23 (0.04)	0.34 (0.09)	0.11 (0.03)
<b>MV Candidates (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.25*** (0.04)			-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.31*** (0.06)
Ethnic identity		0.02* (0.01)		0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Constant	0.44 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.29 (0.01)	0.37 (0.05)	0.26 (0.10)	0.38 (0.05)
<b>MV Issues (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.26*** (0.04)			-0.24*** (0.04)	0.13 (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.05)
Ethnic identity		0.04*** (0.01)		0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.45 (0.03)	0.15 (0.03)	0.28 (0.01)	0.33 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.47 (0.05)
<b>MV PTV (Dummy) ←</b>						
Time Spent in Germany	-0.30*** (0.03)			-0.30*** (0.03)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.41** (0.05)
Ethnic identity		0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)
Discrimination index			-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.34 (0.02)	0.11 (0.04)	0.14 (0.01)	0.33 (0.04)	0.29 (0.09)	0.29 (0.04)
<b>Party ID ←</b>						
MV Party ID (Dummy)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.04)
Age	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.05)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Gender: male	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Interest	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Constant	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)
<b>Candidate evaluation ←</b>						
Party ID	0.27*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)

MV Candidates (Dummy)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Constant	0.49***	0.49***	0.49***	0.49***	0.46***	0.51***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
Issue orientation						
Party ID	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***	0.39***	0.33***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
MV Issues (Dummy)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
PTV ←						
Party ID	2.24***	2.24***	2.24***	2.24***	2.65***	1.89***
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.35)
Candidate evaluation	3.61***	3.61***	3.61***	3.61***	4.28***	3.02***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Issue orientation	1.57***	1.57***	1.57***	1.57***	0.81	2.16***
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.67)	(0.35)
MV PTV (Dummy)	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.71)	(0.29)
Stack	-0.32***	-0.32***	-0.32***	-0.32***	-0.30***	-0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Group (base: Turkish)	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14		
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)		
Constant	3.14***	3.14***	3.14***	3.14***	2.65***	3.19***
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.29)
<hr/>						
var(e.MV Party ID (Dummy))						
Constant	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.09
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
var(e.Party ID)						
Constant	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
var(e.Candidate evaluation)						
Constant	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<hr/>						
var(e.Issue orientation)						
Constant	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
var(e.MV PTV (Dummy))						
Constant	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.07	0.14
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<hr/>						
var(e.PTV)						
Constant	6.63***	6.63***	6.63***	6.63***	5.95***	7.10***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.33)
<hr/>						
var(e.MV Candidates (Dummy))						
Constant	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.21
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
<hr/>						
var(e.MV Issues (Dummy))						
Constant	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.21
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
<hr/>						
cov(e.Candidate evaluation,e.Issue orientation)						
Constant	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<hr/>						
N	5412	5412	5412	5412	2592	2820

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