

# Accumulating Differences across the Political Life Cycle: Political Socialisation, Resources and the Mobilisation to Vote among Immigrant-Origin and Native Voters

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Abstract.

Previous studies have demonstrated that the explanatory models underlying individual voting participation are the same across immigrant-origin and native voters, i.e., lower levels of positive determinants or higher levels of negative determinants relate to lower turnout in these models. However, the immigrant participation gap is largely caused by different distributions of predictor variables that advantage native over immigrant-origin voters. This paper aims to delve further into the topic by theoretically combining established theories into a three-phased political life cycle model that can account for these gaps: (a) political socialisation experiences: voters are less socialised into political activity when their parents are politically less integrated, (b) resources: voters have fewer resources that are relevant for voting, such as economic resources, education, or knowledge about the political system, and (c) mobilisation: political parties mobilise voters differently, depending on strategic considerations and residency patterns.

Using a novel dataset, STUDY, the paper tests a three-phase model of the political life cycle on representative samples from several immigrant-origin and native groups of German citizens in the city of METROPOLIS in the 2021 Bundestag election during the Covid-19 pandemic. Looking at three dependent variables political interest, prospective voting and perceived ease of voting, we find differences between immigrant-origin and majority voters in all three phases: during the time of politically coming of age; during the period of accumulating relevant resources, and finally, during the run-up to the election through exposure to the mobilising efforts of the political parties. The empirical findings explain the persistent puzzle of lower turnout among immigrant-origin voters by integrating theoretical explanations of voting abstention. The data also unveil the heterogeneity within the group of immigrant-origin and native voters and demonstrate that immigrant-origin voters are not generally disadvantaged across the political life cycle. The results imply that researchers must theoretically and empirically approach political participation and associated gaps in an integrated approach covering voters from all backgrounds.

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Main idea for the paper: AG; literature review, theory-building and research design: AG, SJM; data management, survey field management, collection of campaign activities and statistical analysis: JE; first draft: AG; final draft: JE, AG, SJM.

## 1 Introduction

The immigrant-native turnout gap – i.e., that immigrant-origin voters are less likely to turn out than native voters – is a widely reported pattern (e.g., Geese, 2022; Rapp, 2020). The estimated differences vary by groups and by countries analysed, but the gaps usually range in Western democracies from 12 percentage points between ethnic minority and majority voters in British general elections (Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2005) and up to 20 percentage points between non-European-origin and native voters in French metropolises (Maxwell, 2009). In general, the electoral participation of immigrant-origin voters can be explained well by established theories of voter turnout that can be subsumed under the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Differences in turnout are mainly due to differences in the levels of explanatory variables and not in the underlying causal mechanisms (Ruedin, 2018; Spies, Mayer, & Goerres, 2020). In this sense, immigrant-origin citizens are less likely to vote because they have fewer civic skills, lower levels of political interest and civic duty, they are less likely to identify with a political party, and they talk less about politics of the host country with their family and friends (e.g., Maxwell, 2009; Rapp, 2020; Sanders, Heath, Fisher, & Sobolewska, 2014).

Previous research has revealed different distributions for key predictor variables but so far it remains unclear when, where, and why these differences have originated (Ruedin, 2018; Spies et al., 2020). We rely on the concept of the political life cycle – an established conceptual heuristic from the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Nie, Verba, & Kim, 1974) – and argue that there are three overlapping phases that mainly affect important antecedent factors of turnout likelihood such as civic skills and political interest: primary socialisation, resource accumulation, and direct mobilisation. These three life-cycle phases can be activating: growing up in a politically interested family and an affluent country with a democratic regime, acquiring resources such as political knowledge, and having access to mobilising social networks and party activities. These major parameters advantage native over immigrant-origin voters and add to the immigrant turnout gap. However, these relationships have not been tested so far in conjunction, as data to analyse immigrants' political behaviour is scarce, and relevant indicators, such as on political socialisation are usually not available.

Here, we aim to analyse the extent to which the immigrant participation gap in voter turnout relates to differences in socialisation, resource accumulation, and mobilisation. We draw on original data from a three-wave random-sampled telephone survey of native and immigrant-origin voters during the German federal election of 2021 that took place in the large German

city of METROPOLIS during the Covid-19 pandemic. Even though this study is only from one city, it has the advantage of offering the possibility of longitudinal analyses in the context of the election campaign that was led during hard times likely to give acerbated inequalities between different groups. It also contains many important variables, both from the survey and residential characteristics of respondents, and includes both immigrant-origin and native groups in statistically large numbers. In addition, these samples are not convenience samples; they consist of random samples of individuals from the citizen register, the local government-run register mandatory for all residents, which allows for unbiased estimates. As dependent variables we use political interest, propensity to vote and the perceived ease of voting.

Our study bridges integration and election research by testing universal causal mechanisms that are in place for all voters, irrespective of their backgrounds as immigrants or whether they are the children of immigrants or natives. We show that the likelihood of turnout follows the same explanatory model. It is just the endowment with certain predictors of voting that varies across individuals and across groups. Voters who grew up in a low-awareness household with regard to politics, who have few resources to participate, and who are not exposed to mobilisation efforts by political actors and other voters, are less likely to vote, no matter whether they are of immigrant-origin or a German native.

## **2 A Three-Phase Model of the Political Life Cycle**


Electoral participation is a form of political participation and can be explained well by the established Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba et al., 1995). This model traces non-participation back to three major strands of explanation. First, drawing on the resource model, individuals' resources are one of the most important factors for explaining participation possibilities (Schlozman, Burns, & Verba, 1994). Having access to resources such as cognitive skills, as well as to time and money, increases political interest and knowledge, and thus increases the likelihood of participation (Dalton, 2017). A second strand focuses on psychological reasons: having internalised a sense of civic duty, for example, increases participation (e.g., Blais & Achen, 2018), but political involvement also makes it more likely that an individual will participate. Being involved in the system matters, either by identifying with a party, and thus rooting for it, or by having high levels of internal and external political efficacy, and thus feeling in charge of one's choices (e.g., Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2010). A third strand focuses more on mobilisation: political discussions with close friends and family, as well as direct messages from political elites during the election campaign or in everyday life, can mobilise individuals to participate (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993).

Prior work on voting participation has already shown that the explanatory model among immigrant-origin and native voters is largely the same (Sanders et al., 2014; Spies et al., 2020). Compositional effects can thus explain the main differences in voting participation between the two groups. The different distribution of predictor variables in a largely additive model explains the variance across groups as well as within them. So far, we do not know at which point in the life cycle the differences in the predictor variables arise. For a deeper understanding, we will now rely on the heuristic of a political life-cycle model that stratifies phases where differences can occur across a voter’s lifetime.

For our theoretical framework, we draw on existing theories to propose a life-cycle model of voting participation that can structure the socialisation experiences of immigrants and natives alike (Butler & Stokes, 1974; Emmenegger, Marx, & Schraff, 2016; Highton & Wolfinger, 2001; Plutzer, 2002). We argue that three distinct phases meaningfully structure a voter’s political life: socialisation, resource accumulation, and mobilisation efforts (see Table 1 for an overview).

Theoretically, our approach embodies an adapted model of civic voluntarism and political socialisation research focused on determinants that vary within the group of immigrant-origin voters and between immigrant-origin and native voters.

Table 1: Overview of the political life cycle

Phase	Phase 1 Socialisation (Adolescence, early adulthood)	Phase 2 Accumulating Resources	Phase 3 Mobilisation through Election Campaign Exposure
<i>Temporal closeness to election</i> 			
Main indicators	Socialisation agent (political interest, native citizenship, level of education)  Quality of democracy and economic development in country of origin when aged 14-16	Socioeconomic status: education, economic activity, income  Political knowledge	Campaign activity in borough  Personal contact with party  Political discussion with a close person

## 2.1 Phase 1: Political Socialisation in the Family and in a Regime

Phase 1 is during late adolescence: around the ages of 14–16. During these impressionable years, individuals are exposed to politics in various domains, mostly through different socialisation agents, such as school, peers, and the family (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Dinas, 2010, 2012; Osborne, Sears, & Valentino, 2011; van DITMARS, 2023). In this phase, many stimulating or de-stimulating processes are at work that have effects lasting into adulthood. Out of the many processes that occur at this time, we focus on the role of the family, a role that is deemed the most important one by some researchers (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). We do not want to downplay the role of other possible agents, but we argue that for adolescents of between 14 and 16, the most consistent socialisation agent is a parent or a comparable adult. We suppose that this *main socialisation agent* is ideally an important go-to person in terms of politics and might have the potential to push a young individual into voting.

The process of parental socialisation, especially among immigrant families, is likely to be bi-directional, not only do parents influence their children, but children influence their parents (Wong & Tseng, 2008). In this study, we will only focus on the “trickle-down” effect from parent to child rather than the “bottom-up” effect from child to parent.

The causal processes likely to be at work are many, and we will not be able to disentangle them at a very fine-grained level. The simultaneous workings of attitudinal and value transfer, and shared milieu effects, are especially difficult to separate (Dalton, 1982; Hatemi et al., 2009). Exposure to conversations about politics is probably the most important mechanism for increasing the importance and salience of politics among young people. Role modelling as either a politically active or as a politically passive person is another important mechanism. Previous studies have indeed shown that individuals with family members who are actively engaged with politics – by reading or talking about it, or by discussing it – are more likely to be politically active in later life as well. These experiences affect political interest (Neundorf, Smets, & García-Albacete, 2013) and the emergence of political attitudes in general (van Deth, Abend-schön, & Vollmar, 2011), and they manifest themselves in voting participation in later life. Even though these early in-family experiences of voting as a civic duty are strong, they are however not resistant to change once children leave their parents’ home (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012), making it unclear how much residual effect is still measurable in later life.

With parents not being the only socialisation agents in adolescence, we turn towards national context for additional, relevant experiences. To that end, we explore the lingering impact of the democratic tradition and the stage of economic development of the country that a person

grew up in at that age. Our proposition is that in democratic settings, exposure of adolescents to democratic norms is more likely in a democratic setting than in a non-democratic setting. This will have lasting effects in later life. We thereby build on studies that have demonstrated the lingering impact of regime socialisation on party preferences (Just, 2019) and on turnout (Zagórski, 2021) and that have shown the lack of evidence for migration changing the basic attitudes towards the state (Hedegaard & Bekhuis, 2018). Similarly, the literature on economic development and political changes posits that higher economic development leads to greater political participation because of growing middle classes, higher urbanisation and more complex economic exchanges (Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969). We can expect a lingering effect of this experience during the impressionable years.

Regarding differences between immigrant-origin and native voters, we expect the mechanisms of socialisation to work equally for activating or deactivating individuals with and without an immigration origin. A lower likelihood of voting might occur in either native or immigrant-origin families that show a low salience for politics. However, we assume that the availability of such a main political socialisation agent varies between the groups. In general, parents are supposed to be less involved and less active in host country politics when compared with ethnic majority voters. This already disadvantages immigrant-origin voters.

We thus hypothesise (H1): The main socialisation agents in the family are, on average, less politicised among immigrant-origin voters than among native voters. Similarly, immigrant-origin voters were more likely to have grown up in an economically less developed country with a non-democratic regime. Thus the positive effects of political socialisation are smaller for immigrant-origin voters.

## *2.2 Phase 2: Resources for Participation*

Returning to the life-cycle model, there is a second important life phase that is mainly about resources and that stretches from early school age into the professional life. Individuals accumulate resources that enable them to participate in politics (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). Most importantly, formal education provides people with knowledge about the educational system, as well as providing them with competences to understand and process political information. Occupational experience also exposes individuals to skills and motivations that they can draw upon to become active in politics. Knowledge about the political system and details of the political landscape is another direct manifestation of differences in resource endowment for voting participation (Adman & Strömblad, 2018; Larcinese, 2007).

From early on in life, such resource endowments affect the likelihood of participation in elections, because the so-called “start-up costs” of voting (Schäfer, Roßteutscher, & Abendschön, 2020) are lower among those with more resources. Furthermore, resource endowments affect turnout decisions directly, as navigating the political system is easier and less costly.

Again, we expect voters from all backgrounds to be equally affected by these mechanisms. Higher educated native and immigrant-origin voters have more resources, which make it easier for them to vote than their lesser educated peers. The level of available resources varies between immigrant-origin and native voters, with the first usually having lower levels of resources on average than the latter (e.g., Rapp, 2020). We expect that resource accumulation is thus lower among immigrant-origin voters than among native voters (H2).

### 2.3 Phase 3: Mobilisation in social networks and by political parties

Finally, there is the third life-cycle phase with short-term effects just before the election. Here, the main idea is that people are *mobilised* into participation throughout election campaigns. Parties and candidates reach out to potential voters on their doorsteps, through social media, and with postal mailings (Partheymüller & Schmitt-Beck, 2013). Immigrant-origin voters may be especially receptive to activities from activists from the same immigrant-origin, especially since these activists are more likely to drop out faster from the parliamentary process (van de WARDT, van WITTELOOSTUIJN, CHAMBERS, & WAUTERS, 2021). However, the incentives for parties to approach voters vary. Local evidence supports the idea that, strategically, parties prefer those better-off districts with a higher turnout (Roßteutscher & Schäfer, 2016). Furthermore, political discussions with trusted others are important to raise awareness for the approaching election, and to increase the likelihood to turn out (e.g., Fieldhouse, Cutts, Widdop, & John, 2013).<sup>1</sup>

Again, we expect the effects of mobilisation to be the same for immigrant-origin and for native voters, but we assume residency patterns vary between the two groups, and this might generate a different kind of exposure pattern. Immigrant-origin voters, for example, could live in areas that are visited less by campaigning politicians, and thus those voters are less exposed to the stimuli of the election campaign. Furthermore, immediate exposure to political discussions about the election might be lower due to ethnic homophily patterns (Fieldhouse et al.,

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<sup>1</sup> A study of ethnic minorities in Britain focuses on the mobilising function of minority churches, a factor unlikely to matter in the German context with a different set of minority groups, see Sobolewska, Fisher, Heath, and Sanders (2015).

2013; Galandini & Fieldhouse, 2019). We thus expect mobilisation efforts and experiences to be lower among immigrant-origin voters than among native voters (H3).

### **3 Data and Methods**

#### *3.1 A Three-Wave Panel Survey of Immigrant-Origin and Native Voters During the 2021 Bundestag Campaign*

For our study, we rely on a stratified four-group random sample, for which we carried out a three-wave telephone survey: the STUDY data. This data allow us to use individual-level data from two pre-election and one post-election survey waves among immigrant-origin and native voters. We augment this data on the address level with context-level information on campaign activity and official borough characteristics.

The STUDY data were collected around the German Bundestag election (26 September, 2021) between May and November 2021 in the city of METROPOLIS. It received clearance from the data protection officer for its data handling. During this time, numerous restrictions were in effect due to COVID-19. These included, for example, restricted access to public buildings, testing obligations, and school closures. The study was originally planned before Covid-19 and many adaptive decisions had to be taken on the way.

Therefore, we implemented only survey modes with no direct personal contact. Respondents were recruited by postal invitation in March and April 2021 to gather their telephone numbers and to acquire their consent to take part in the three-wave telephone survey. The population register of METROPOLIS – a city of about 500,000 inhabitants in GERMANSTATE, Germany – was used as the sampling frame from which a simple random sample was drawn of all eligible voters aged 18 and older ( $n = 70,000$ ). In the next step, to be able to oversample immigrant-origin voters, first-name–surname combinations of all target persons were classified using an onomastic approach from a specialised company (Liebau, Humpert, & Schneiderheinze, 2018). With this method, all names of individuals of Turkish descent, of descent from the successor states of the USSR or from any other country, and from natives were identified. All individuals in the sample who were classified as being from a country other than Germany – as well as 4,500 randomly drawn persons classified as Germans with no migration background – were invited by mail to take part in the survey. Target persons received a postal survey invitation and were asked to answer a few basic questions on their political interest, economic situation, and their voting preferences, as well as their year of birth, their gender, and their



own and their parents' country of birth. This recruitment stage was used to verify the registry data and the onomastic classification as well as to gather consent and contact details for the telephone interviews that would follow between June and November 2021. Out of 100 individuals from each group, the postal invitation was replied to (participation in wave 1 of the phone survey completed) by 21 (10) natives, 13 (5) Germans of Turkish descent, 24 (8) Germans from the Soviet Union or one of its successor states, and 16 (7) Germans from any other country.

An average response rate of 7.5 % (30 interviews from 400 postal invitations) across the four groups may seem low at first sight, but it is quite an achievement given the nature of the samples – three immigrant-origin groups in a relatively poor city (see the next section for details) – and given the severe COVID-19 crisis with a partial lockdown in place and with no vaccinations available for the general population (except for the very aged). We conducted additional analyses on the nature of non-response, showing that only few demographic and borough-level variables have a significant impact on response outcomes. However, higher political interest is a strong predictor for participation in the first CATI panel wave. We created high-quality posterior weights in order to correct for misclassification errors, non-response bias and panel attrition (available upon request).

The first wave contains 1,414 complete interviews with 618 native respondents, 313 Germans of Turkish descent, 122 Russian Germans, and 361 Germans with any other migration background. The overall number of respondents decreases to 910 in the third panel wave due to panel attrition (see Table 8 in the Online Appendix for more details of response and panel attrition rates). Respondents were interviewed for different aspects, such as their political opinion and behaviour, contact with election campaigns, media use, and demographics. After each completed interview, respondents received incentives of about 10 €, either as cash or with the option of donating to a local charity.

In the following statistical analyses, we combine information from all three survey waves with historical and spatial context data into a dataset with one respondent as one observation.

### 3.2 *The Context of the Data Collection*

The city of METROPOLIS is a typical West German metropolis with a strong industrial tradition, a history of economic decline, and regular flows of immigrants during different episodes of its history. After World War II, the city witnessed large inflows of guest workers and their families, later there were EU immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria, and more recently, refugees from Syria. In 2020, the biggest immigrant communities in METROPOLIS in terms of

foreign citizenship were Turks (28.1 % of all foreigners), Bulgarians (11.6 %), Syrians (9.3 %), and Romanians (8.2 %) (BLINDED). In 2021, there were 319,000 eligible voters in METROPOLIS, of whom 19.7 % had a first- or second-generation immigrant origin (personal communication with the local statistics office).

METROPOLIS is an unequal city with large differences among the 46 boroughs in social deprivation, share of foreign-born population, and voter turnout. The initial data collection took place during one of the partial lockdown episodes of the 2020–22 corona pandemic: March to May 2021. The original letters to resident citizens were sent out when most shops, besides those providing bare necessities, were closed, large numbers of employees were working from home, and the schooling of children was set to home schooling or a mixture of small-group in-person teaching and remote teaching. As a consequence, the 2021 election campaign in Germany, as well as in METROPOLIS, was probably different from the usual election campaigns, with fewer street activities and many more online-only activities because of the pandemic. All of these contextual features made the setting unique. However, we still assume that during that lockdown episode METROPOLIS was typical of other unequal cities with their diverse citizenry during that period.

### *3.3 The Dependent Variables: Prospective Likelihood of Voting, Political Interest, and the Retrospectively Attributed Ease of Voting*

In most election studies, the share of non-voters for retrospective participation questions is systematically biased due to lower participation rates among the politically disinterested as well as due to social desirability among those taking part (e.g., Smets & van Ham, 2013). In our raw sample, retrospective voting participation was 93.2 %.<sup>2</sup> This made the proportion of non-voters so small that statistically this left us with little power. Therefore, we rely on three dependent variables that capture the likelihood of direct turnout as well as causally close antecedents.<sup>3</sup>

Our first dependent variable, the pre-election intention to vote in the election or not, was measured in wave 2. This was measured on a 5-point rating scale ranging from ‘definitely not going to vote’ to ‘definitely going to vote’. We will refer to this variable as the ‘propensity to participate’ (ptp). The second dependent variable is ‘political interest’ and was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from being ‘not at all interested’ to being ‘very interested’ in politics. This item

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<sup>2</sup> Anecdotally, we know from other electoral researchers with the same problem of low absolute prevalence of non-voters in samples during the Covid-19 era.

<sup>3</sup> We experimented with Firth rare-event logistic regressions to no avail: all estimates were unstable.

was implemented in all waves. Using the item from the final survey – wave 3 – we can make sure that it is exogenous to all the independent variables described below that we collected in waves 1 and 2.

Our third dependent variable is the retrospectively attributed ‘ease of voting’ from the third panel wave. Respondents could state on a 4-point scale whether it was ‘very hard’, ‘rather hard’, ‘rather easy’ or ‘very easy’ to decide about turning out to vote.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.4 The Independent Variables from the Three Phases of the Political Life Cycle and Controls

Our independent variables are structured according to the three phases of the political life-cycle. Regarding the first phase – *political socialisation* – two groups of independent variables are combined to represent the socialisation processes in early adulthood (all distributions are displayed in Table 3). First, we use retrospective information about three factors: the political interest, educational attainment and German citizenship of their main socialisation agent, German citizenship being a prerequisite for the agent being able to vote. In panel wave 2, respondents were asked whether their father, or whether their mother (to save survey time, we randomly assigned whom we asked for first), lived with them when they were 16 years old (see the Online Appendix,

Table 10: VIF and Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity per model

Independent variable	Political interest	OLS Regression Propensity
Soc. agent German citizen		2.1
Soc. agent higher education entrance		1.1
Political interest soc. agent		1.1
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: <i>Not fully democratic</i> )		
Fully democratic		2.1
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: <i>low</i> )		
Medium		3.1
High		9.1
Socioeconomic Status		1.1
Political knowledge index		1.1
Number of contacts with party campaigners		1.1

<sup>4</sup> The item was used in Germany, for instance in the 2005 campaign study. Schmitt-Beck and Faas (2009).

Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough			1.
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough			1.
Num. of pol. discussion partners ( <i>ref.: 0</i> )			
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1			2.
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2			2.
Age			4.
Male			1.
Partner			1.
Origin group ( <i>ref.: Natives</i> )			
Turkish origin			2.
Russian German			1.
Other background			1.
		Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisb	
Chi <sup>2</sup> (1)	13.14		526.62
P-value	0.0003		0.0000

Table 11, for the full wording of questions). If it was the father, further questions in this section were asked with reference to the father, otherwise respondents were asked about the mother. After this, they could make statements about citizenship, formal education, their political in-

terest, and the party preference of their primary socialisation agent. Of course, as this information is asked retrospectively, it is prone to recall biases and social desirability. Still, we believe that the questions that were asked focus mainly on objective facts (citizenship/educational attainment) and asking about political interest is easier to answer than asking about partisan leanings, another retrospective question that is often used (e.g., Macfarlane, 2022). This measurement of political socialisation is further enriched by the characteristics of the respondents' countries of residence at age 16. We can merge historical contextual information with the data. In order to test how economic power and democratisation influence socialisation in terms of political participation, we use two variables. One is the annual polity score from the Polity5 Project (Marshall, Monty G., Ted, Robert G., 2019). This measures regime categories on a 21-point scale between -10 (hereditary monarchy) and +10 (consolidated democracy) in the respondent's country of residence when they were 16 years old. The second one is gross domestic product per capita in US dollar at 2015 prices (The World Bank, 2021) in the resident country at the time when the respondent was 16 years of age.

To measure *resources* that enable individuals to participate in politics, we use two separate indices of socioeconomic status (SES) and political knowledge. The SES index includes the reported total household income in categories divided by the total number of household members, including those who are in employment or in formal education. For political knowledge, we compute an index that adds up the number of correct answers to five questions on both the German and EU electoral system, and on the party affiliations of three German politicians who lead national party lists. Both indices are normalised to range between 0 and 1.

The third and last phase we operationalise is *mobilisation* by political parties and social peers. In order to measure mobilisation by political parties, the STUDY surveyed campaign activities by all political parties in METROPOLIS between June and September 2021. Every campaign event published in newspapers, in public broadcasting, or through a party's social media and website was coded at the level of the 46 boroughs. Events were weighted by their importance, with, for example, flyer campaigns receiving a value of 1, campaign events by local politicians receiving a value of 2, and invitations of top candidates being weighted with a value of 3. Across the 46 boroughs, this summative index of campaign activities across all parties ranges from 0 to 18 with a mean of 6. In addition, in the second wave – which took place during the very active phase of the election campaign – respondents were asked whether they had contact with a campaigner during an event or through canvassing. These two variables help us to understand how individuals' political environments and experiences were shaped by the election campaign. A third variable is the number of political discussion partners. This variable

ranges from zero to two as a measure of personal networks. Respondents were asked to name the personal characteristics (age, gender) of up to two political discussion partners, if they mentioned they had any, whereby this variable was simply the number of discussion partners mentioned to a maximum of two. The last variable belonging to this block of variables is the aggregated turnout in the respondents' boroughs during the previous 2017 Bundestag election. The variance in this context variable expresses the intensity of political participation in the social environment of individuals, and it captures the intensity of the social norm of voting in residential surroundings. Given the political inequality of METROPOLIS, turnout in 2017 ranged between 45,0 % and 80,7 % with a mean of 68,7 %.

As control variables, we include age, gender, living with a partner, and most importantly, three dummy variables that capture the differences between the three immigrant-origin groups and natives as the baseline.

### 3.5 *Analytical strategy*

The argument that we make hinges on two empirical assessments. First, we must check about the group difference on the independent variables predicting our dependent variables. As we will demonstrate, not all differences in means or proportions go in the expected directions between native and immigrant-origin voters. Second, we assess the precision and the size of the estimated coefficients from the different phases jointly in a regression analysis. The regression analysis is a weighted analysis of an essentially cross-sectional data set with one row per respondent and some independent variables lagged from an earlier wave. The objective is to reduce the coefficients of the group indicators (Russian Germans, Germans of Turkish descent, Germans with any other immigrant origin and natives) to zero, so that we capture all the inter-group variance in our systematic variables.

## 4 **Empirical Analysis**

We first look at the bivariate patterns of the dependent and the independent variables of interest by groups (the analyses by all subgroups are in the Appendix), and we then turn to the multivariate regression analysis.

### 4.1 *Bivariate Analysis across Groups*

Table 2 reports our three dependent variables: the propensity to participate, political interest, and the ease of voting. For all dependent variables, we see that immigrant-origin voters have lower means than natives (DNM) except for the propensity to vote where the means are the

same. But we also see variations between the three immigrant-origin groups of Turkish origin (DTUR), Russian Germans (DRUS) and Germans of any other immigration origin (DOM). On political interest and ease of voting, Germans with an immigrant origin other than Russian German or Turkish (DOM), have the same or an even higher mean than native voters. This variation across groups reminds us of the great political heterogeneity among immigrant-origin voters.

Table 2: Distributions of dependent variables. Weighted results.

		Natives	Immigrant-origin			
			All	Turkish origin	Russian German	Other back-ground
Variable	Range	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Political interest	1-5	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.6
Propensity to vote	1-5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7
Ease of voting	1-4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.5

Table 3 reveals the mean values for all independent variables for natives and for immigrant-origin voters. (For the estimates of the three subgroups of Russian Germans, Germans of Turkish descent, and Germans of any other immigrant origin see Table 4 in the Appendix.) The last column of Table 3 contains the difference between the estimated means across all variables. A positive difference means that native Germans are better endowed with a positively expected predictor of our dependent variables, and thus they are advantaged; a negative value reflects an advantage for immigrant origin voters. Glancing across the columns, we see that for Phase 1 Political socialisation, immigrant-origin voters are on average disadvantaged on all indicators, except the main socialisation agent having a high school degree. Here, the immigrant-origin group has a slightly higher prevalence of 18.4 compared to 18.2 among natives - a difference of -0.2. In Phase 2 Resources, we see a similar surprise in the variable socioeconomic status, which is on average higher for immigrant-origin voters than for natives, whereas for the political knowledge index the difference (+8) advantages the native Germans, as expected. For Phase 3 Mobilisation, we see that immigrant-origin voters are actually advantaged by two of the four variables: live in a borough with more campaign activities (-0.1); more likely to have been personally approached by a party or politician (-0.12), while natives live in higher turnout-boroughs (+2).

This simple analysis across groups already yields important results. The group of immigrant-origin voters – compared with the group of native voters – is not always disadvantaged across these predictors of our antecedents of turnout. We must thus reject the broad-sweep expectations that we formulated in the three hypotheses as not all indicators disadvantage on average immigrant-origin voters. The data neither reveal that groups of immigrant-origin voters are not ALWAYS structurally at a disadvantage nor on ALL dimensions. This pattern is a function of the composition of the heterogeneity within the group of immigrant-origin and native voters that warrants an individual-level analysis that transcends the overly naïve group perspective.

Table 3: Coding and distributions of independent variables. Weighted estimates.

Variable	Survey Wave	Coding	Natives	Immigrant-origin	$\Delta$ Natives-Immigrant-origin
<i>Phase 1: Political socialisation</i>					
Socialisation agent	1	Yes/no (proportion yes in %)	100	37.1	22.9
Socialisation agent	1	Yes/no (proportion yes in %)	18.4	18.6	-0.2
Political interest of socialisation agent	1	Scale 1–5 (means)	3.1	2.6	0.5
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16	context	Not fully democratic (Polity5 index < 10) (proportion in %)	0	21.8	-21.8
	context	Fully democratic (Polity5 index = 10) (proportion in %)	100	78.2	21.8
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16	context	Below 15.000 (proportion in %)	15.8	21.8	-6
	context	15.001- 30.000 (proportion in %)	45.2	24.5	20.7
	context	30.001 or higher (proportion in %)	39	53.8	-14.8
<i>Phase 2: Resources for participation</i>					
Socioeconomic status	1	Index: 0–100 (mean)	48.5	54	-5.5
Political knowledge	1	Index: 0–100 (mean)	56	48	8
<i>Phase 3: Mobilisation by parties</i>					
Number of political discussion partners: 0	1	Percent	9.2	14.6	-5.4
Number of political discussion partners: 1	1	Percent	25.6	29.8	-4.2
Number of political discussion partners: 2	1	Percent	65.3	55.6	9.7
Context: campaign activity of Bundestag	context	Number of campaign activities of	6.3	6.4	-0.1



parties in resp. borough		Bundestag parties weighted by intensity (mean)			
Reported direct contact with election campaigners	2	Absolute number (max = 4) (mean)	0.04	0.16	-0.12
Context: turnout in resp. borough in 2017 election	context	Percent: (mean)	0–100,	54	52
					2

#### 4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis


Let us now turn to the multiple OLS regression analysis with weighted observations and robust standard errors and group fixed effects. Recall that we have one respondent as one observation, and thus we have a cross-sectional dataset, even though the independent variables are (sometimes) lagged by one wave compared to the dependent variables. Our main empirical objective is to reduce the coefficient of the three group dummy variables to zero. If we manage that, we will have captured all residual variance between the three subgroups of immigrant origin and the group of natives.

Figure 1 displays the coefficient plot with 95 % confidence intervals for the most comprehensive models. All estimated effects are directly comparable for size, as the independent variables and the dependent variables were normalised to range from 0 to 1. Most importantly, there is no significant variation between the four groups left. This means that the comprehensive model of all theoretical perspectives – socialisation, resources, and mobilisation – can explain inter-group differences.

Let us now concentrate on those predictors that capture systematic effects: the recalled political interest of the socialisation agent from Phase 1 (Political socialisation) of the political life-cycle model is a powerful predictor, with an effect size of 10 percentage points (please recall that all predictors and dependent variables were changed to range from 0 to 1). The cumulated index of political knowledge from Phase 2 Resources is a strong predictor, with 30 percentage points, and the number of contacts with party campaigners from Phase 3 Mobilisation has an effect of 23 percentage points. Across the models reported in the full table (appendix Table 5 to Table 7), the German citizenship of the main socialisation agent has a mediating effect over discussion partners and loses its effect once that variable is introduced.

We can thus summarise that powerful predictors from all three phases of our political life-cycle model explain the variations in political interest.

Figure 1: Coefficient plot for three dependent variables, unstandardized regression coefficients



Note: The appendix contains three tables with a series of regression models (Table 5 to Table 7), one for each of our three dependent variables: political interest, propensity to participate, and ease of voting.

The results for propensity to participate reflect a similar pattern (see also appendix Table 6), namely that predictors from all three phases of the political life-cycle model systematically explain differences in the propensity to participate. The residual inter-group differences are gone, too. The reported political interest of the socialisation agent has an impact of 8 percentage points on propensity to participate, socioeconomic status an impact of 10 percentage points, and having one or two discussion partners of each 11 and 12 percentage points.

Our last model (see also appendix Table 7) reports the coefficient plot from the ease of voting: the higher the value the easier the individual reports their decision to cast a vote. Again, a very similar picture arises to what we have seen before. There are no significant differences between the groups left. The socialisation perspective from phase 1 of the life-cycle model does not capture a significant coefficient this time, but the reported political interest of the socialisation agent again has a positive effect of 7 percentage points that is not significant. Socioeconomic status from Phase 2 Resources has an estimated impact of 16 percentage points, and political knowledge from the same phase has a barely insignificant effect of 6 percentage points. The number of contacts with party campaigners from phase 3 Mobilisation has the most powerful

estimated effect at 14 percentage points and we find a significant effect of two discussion partners at 8 points compared to having no discussion partner.

Let us now look across models and review some of the overarching evidence. Most importantly, the political life-cycle model, as operationalised here, works – at its core – for three important antecedents of voting participation, namely political interest, the propensity to participate, and ease of voting. We manage to reduce all inter-group differences to non-significant levels. This means that by knowing the variables that we have in the model, we have taken all explanatory power out of the country-of-origin variables. There are four variables that are of importance throughout: the reported interest of the main person in the family where the respondent was socialised; the socioeconomic status and political knowledge as a summary measurement of relevant resources, and finally, the number of contacts with party campaigners. Our attempt to measure more about the socialisation impact of respondents by looking at the merged POLITY-V-score and GDP/capita of the political system at the age of 16 yielded null results. The data never captured any systematic effect and did not always have the expected positive or negative signs.

Further robustness checks for heterogeneity between natives and immigrant origin voters can be found in appendix. They reveal no qualitatively different picture for an analysis per group.

The political life cycle model shows systematic effects at all three phases of the life cycle: political socialisation, resources and mobilisation. However, our hypotheses did not find unequivocal evidence and must be refined. As we have seen in paragraph 4.1. not all intergroup differences go in the expected direction and not all indicators yield significant coefficients in the regression analysis.

Taking a step back from these empirical results, we can deduce that differences between voting and non-voting individuals arise in all three phases of the political life cycle. As an adolescent, it is an advantage to grow up in a household where politics is reflected in the higher interest of the main person from whom you learn. Then, later in life, accumulating relevant resources through education, employment, and income, as well as accumulating political knowledge, increases a person's tendency to vote. Finally, just before the election, being involved in social networks – where politics is discussed more often, partly caused by previous mechanisms – as well as being mobilised by party campaigners, constitute the last change in the political life cycle.

## 5 Our Contributions

This article adds to the literature on immigrant integration and election research by using a parsimonious three-phase model of the political life cycle to analyse antecedents of turnout, political interest, propensity to vote and perceived ease of voting. Previous studies have reported that, broadly, the same factors might explain electoral participation among immigrant-origin and native voters alike, but they still left variations unexplained and could not answer the question about where in the political life-cycle differences arise.

Our analysis shows that the political life cycle can explain differences between immigrant-origin and native voters as to their propensity to participate, their political interest, and their ease of decision to cast their vote. Voters and non-voters across all immigrant-origin and native groups show differences across the political life cycle. Already during the formative years, growing up with more-or-less politically interested socialisation agents accounts for initial differences. As a group, immigrant-origin voters are on average, for instance, disadvantaged regarding the reported political interest of their main family member who is responsible for exposing them to politics.

The overall finding of this study is that differences in turnout between immigrant-origin and native voters can be explained by the same theoretical model. The differences in the endowment with certain predictors makes some eligible voters different from others in their propensity to participate in elections. However, our hypotheses were not fully confirmed: hypothesis 1 summarised the expected disadvantage for immigrant-origin voters exposure to positive socialisation effects. Whereas immigrant-origin voters grew on average up in families less prone to voting and in regimes with a lower socio-economic development and polity score, only the variable group about the main socialisation agent captures a significant effect. Hypothesis 2 describes the expected disadvantage of resources for participation, this difference is only found for political knowledge and not for socio-economic status, a strong predictor than in the regression analysis. Hypothesis 3 pertains to an expected disadvantage in mobilisation due to less favourable residence patterns. Here, only the number of discussion partners favours natives as well as being an important predictor for participation.

The study has its limits, in that we have to use self-reported recalled measures of political interest from participants' adolescence. It could be that those respondents are influenced by their current levels of political interest when they recall the political interest of their main family member. Thus, our findings on socialisation are on weaker ground. As for the other independent variables, we benefit from a panel study where we can measure the main predictor

variables in wave 1 or wave 2, and the dependent variables in wave 3. Thus, we can at least make sure that we reach a weak exogeneity because of temporal precedence. Furthermore, the timing of our data collection and the local specifics of the single city we studied, might additionally affect our findings. However, we believe that METROPOLIS is an example of a modern, multi-immigrant metropolis during that period, and that the switch to fewer street election activities within the election campaign provides a conservative estimate of campaign effects.

The study's findings implies that it is fruitful to theoretically and empirically approach voting research across all group of voters rather than focusing only on immigrant-origin or only on native voters.

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## Appendix

Table 4: Coding and distributions of independent variables separated by immigrant-origin group. Weighted estimates.

Variable	Survey Wave	Coding	Natives	Immigrant-origin	$\Delta$ Natives-Immigrant-origin	Turkish origin	Russian German	Other background
<i>Phase 1: Political socialisation</i>								
Socialisation agent German citizen	1	Yes/no (proportion yes in %)	100	37.1	22.9	21.1	54.1	46.8
Socialisation agent high school degree	1	Yes/no (proportion yes in %)	18.4	18.6	-0.2	11.4	23.4	24.1
Political interest of socialisation agent	1	Scale 1-5 (means)	3.1	2.6	0.5	2.4	2.4	2.8
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16	context	Not fully democratic (Polity5 index < 10) (proportion in %)	0	21.8	-21.8	9.7	43.3	26.1
	context	Fully democratic (Polity5 index = 10) (proportion in %)	100	78.2	21.8	90.3	56.7	74
Context: Gross domestic product per	context	Below 15.000 (proportion in %)	15.8	21.8	-6	9.7	46.3	24.8

capita in US \$ stand- ardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16	context	15.001- 30.000 (proportion in %)	45.2	24.5	20.7	23.4	4.2	33	
	context	30.001 or higher (proportion in %)	39	53.8	-14.8	66.9	49.5	42.2	
<i>Phase 2: Resources for participation</i>									
Socioeconomic sta- tus	1	Index: (mean)	0-100	48.5	54	-5.5	50	60	56
Political knowledge	1	Index: (mean)	0-100	56	48	8	42	38	57
<i>Phase 3: Mobilisation by parties</i>									
Number of political discussion partners: 0	1	Percent		9.2	14.6	-5.4	16	23.1	10.1
Number of political discussion partners: 1	1	Percent		25.6	29.8	-4.2	35.4	25.1	25.9
Number of political discussion partners: 2	1	Percent		65.3	55.6	9.7	48.7	51.8	64
Context: campaign activity of Bundes- tag parties in resp. borough	context	Number of cam- paign activities of Bundestag parties weighted by in- tensity (mean)		6.3	6.4	-0.1	5.7	6.9	7
Reported direct con- tact with election campaigners	2	Absolute number (max = 4) (mean)		0.04	0.16	-0.12	0.2	0.16	0.11
Context: turnout in resp. borough in 2017 election	context	Percent: (mean)	0-100,	54	52	2	50	52	53

Table 5: OLS Regression on political interest (dependent variable from survey wave 3)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
	Political interest	Political interest	Political interest	Political interest	Political interest	Political interest
Soc. agent German citizen		0.03			0.03	0.03
		(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Soc. agent higher education entrance		-0.04			-0.05**	-0.05**
		(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Political interest soc. agent		0.15***			0.13***	0.10***
		(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: Not fully democratic)						
Fully democratic		-0.02			-0.06	-0.06
		(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: low)						
Medium		0.08**			0.07**	0.07*
		(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.03)
High		0.07			0.07	0.06
		(0.05)			(0.05)	(0.05)

Socioeconomic status			0.04 (0.05)		0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Political knowledge index			0.35*** (0.03)		0.35*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.03)
Number of contacts with party campaigners				0.28*** (0.05)		0.23*** (0.04)
Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough				0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough				0.07 (0.07)		0.02 (0.06)
Num. of pol. discussion partners (ref.: 0)						
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1				0.09** (0.04)		0.07** (0.03)
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2				0.20*** (0.03)		0.14*** (0.03)
Constant	0.58*** (0.03)	0.41*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.04)	0.38*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)
Age	0.08* (0.04)	0.13* (0.08)	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.11 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)
Male	0.12*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Partner (yes/no)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)

Origin group (ref.: Natives)						
Turkish origin	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Russian German	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Other background	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
N	910	910	910	910	910	910
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.16	0.29	0.24	0.32	0.38
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.15	0.28	0.23	0.31	0.37

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

Table 6: OLS Regression on propensity to participate (dependent variable from survey wave 2)

	M1 PTP	M2 PTP	M3 PTP	M4 PTP	M5 PTP	M6 PTP
Soc. agent German citizen		-0.01 (0.02)			-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Soc. agent higher education entrance		-0.02 (0.03)			-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Political interest soc. agent		0.11*** (0.03)			0.10*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16						

(ref.: Not fully democratic)

Fully democratic	-0.05 (0.04)		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: low)	0.00		0.00	0.00
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Medium	0.06 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
High	0.07 (0.05)		0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Socioeconomic status		0.13*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)
Political knowledge index		0.07** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Number of contacts with party campaigners			0.07** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough			-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough			0.10** (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Num. of pol. discussion partners (ref.: 0)				



Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1				0.12***		0.11***
				(0.04)		(0.04)
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2				0.14***		0.12***
				(0.04)		(0.04)
Age	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)
Male	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Partner (yes/no)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Origin group (ref.: Natives)						
Turkish origin	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Russian German	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Other background	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Constant	0.91*** (0.02)	0.84*** (0.07)	0.81*** (0.04)	0.74*** (0.06)	0.75*** (0.07)	0.66*** (0.08)
N	910	910	910	910	910	910
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.11
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.00	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.09

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 7: OLS Regression on ease of voting (dependent variable from survey wave 3)

	M1 Ease of voting	M2 Ease of voting	M3 Ease of voting	M4 Ease of voting	M5 Ease of voting	M6 Ease of voting
Soc. agent German citizen		-0.02 (0.04)			-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Soc. agent higher education entrance		-0.01 (0.03)			-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Political interest soc. agent		0.11** (0.04)			0.09** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: Not fully democratic)						
Fully democratic		0.03 (0.05)			0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16 (ref.: low)						
Medium		0.03 (0.05)			0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
High		0.03 (0.06)			0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Socioeconomic status			0.18*** (0.06)		0.18*** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.06)

Political knowledge index			0.11**		0.09**	0.06
			(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of contacts with party campaigners				0.16***		0.14**
				(0.06)		(0.06)
Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough				0.02		0.00
				(0.04)		(0.04)
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough				0.07		0.03
				(0.07)		(0.06)
Num. of pol. discussion partners (ref.: 0)						
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1				0.04		0.04
				(0.05)		(0.05)
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2				0.11***		0.08*
				(0.04)		(0.05)
Age	-0.05	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.04	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Male	0.10***	0.11***	0.08***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Partner (yes/no)	0.06**	0.06**	0.03	0.04*	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Origin group (ref.: Natives)						
Turkish origin	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03

	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Russian German	-0.08*	-0.04	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other background	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	0.79***	0.68***	0.64***	0.66***	0.56***	0.51***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
N	910	910	910	910	910	910
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.11
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

Table 8: response rates per survey wave based on size of sampled strata.

	Survey participation after sampling		Survey participation after consent in wave 0		
	onomastic class. unverified (in %)		onomastic classification verified (in %)		
	Postal screening wave → CATI wave 1 → CATI wave 1 →				
Origin group	Postal screening wave <sup>5</sup>	CATI wave 1	CATI wave 1	CATI wave 2	CATI wave 3
Natives	21	10	48	80	71

<sup>5</sup> This includes any response to the survey invitation where answers were given. Percentages can include respondents who answered and sent back the questionnaire, but did not give consent to be interviewed in CATI wave 1.

Turkish origin	13	5	37	69	50
Russian German	24	8	32	64	55
Other background	16	7	42	79	68

Table 9: Hausman test of similarity of coefficient including estimates that vary within native sample

Independent variable	Natives	Immigrant	Difference	Std. error	P-value
Soc. agent higher education entrance	-.0725904	-.0231599	-.0494305	.0583163	
Political interest soc. agent	.1270703	.0582533	.0688171	.052273	
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16					
(ref.: low)	-.1218966	.0335261	-.1554227	.1023737	
Medium	-.0024137	-.0104813	.0080675	.0519785	
High	-.0214756	-.0072068	-.0142689	.1145488	
Socioeconomic status	.181794	.0531224	.1286716	.0695803	
Political knowledge index	.1255093	-.0038077	.129317	.0576052	
Number of contacts with party campaigners	-.0006179	.0705572	-.0711751	.2738974	
Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough	.0655315	-.0231905	.0887221	.0511071	
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough	-.0245667	.1181415	-.1427082	.0825428	
Num. of pol. discussion partners					
(ref.: 0)					
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1	.0949331	.09199	.0029431	.0546203	
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2	.0676797	.1188645	-.0511848	.0506854	
Age	-.0274985	.1061708	-.1336693	.1708647	
Male	-.0315039	-.0176427	-.0138612	.030949	
Partner (yes/no)	.020787	-.0164483	.0372354	.0275946	
Constant	.7727396	.7118751	.0608645	.1747896	

Table 10: VIF and Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity per model

Independent variable	OLS Regression Model		
	Political interest	Propensity to participate	Ease of voting
		VIF	
Soc. agent German citizen		2.23	
Soc. agent higher education entrance		1.19	
Political interest soc. agent		1.18	
Context: Polity status in the country of residence at age 16 ( <i>ref.: Not fully democratic</i> )			
Fully democratic		2.80	
Context: Gross domestic product per capita in US \$ standardized 2015 in the country of residence at age 16 ( <i>ref.: low</i> )			
Medium		3.97	
High		9.18	
Socioeconomic Status		1.38	
Political knowledge index		1.28	
Number of contacts with party campaigners		1.04	
Bundestag parties campaign activity in borough		1.03	
Turnout 2017 Bundestag election per borough		1.08	
Num. of pol. discussion partners ( <i>ref.: 0</i> )			
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 1		2.48	
Num. of pol. discussion partners: 2		2.62	
Age		4.75	
Male		1.09	
Partner		1.22	
Origin group			

(ref.: Natives)

Turkish origin	2.47
Russian German	1.50
Other background	1.79

---

Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Chi <sup>2</sup> (1)	13.14	526.62	58.20
P-value	0.0003	0.0000	0.0000

---

*Table 11: STUDY II survey questions on respondent's primary socialisation agent.*



*Pr086: Primary Socialisation Agent*

**Prog.: Split sample in two; 50% of respondents should be asked about father first and then, only if answer Pro86a1=3 the question Pro86a2 about mother; 50% of respondents should be asked about mother first and only if Pro86a2=3, then Pro86a1 about father.**

Pr086a

*Prog.: if Split=1*

*Pr086a1: Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your youth. When you were 16 years old, did your biological father live with you?*

*Int.: If no, inquire if stepfather lived there*

1: Yes, the biological father -> SOCPERSON = father.

2: No, but a stepfather -> SOCPERSON = stepfather

3: No, neither biological, nor stepfather

98: Don't know

99: no answer

*Pr086a2: Did your birth mother live with you when you were 16 years old?*

*Prog.: If Pr086a1 = 3*

1: yes birthmother -> SOCPERSON = mother

2: no, but my stepmother = SOCPERSON = stepmother

3: no, neither birth mother nor stepmother

98: Don't know

99: no answer

*Prog.: If Split =2*

**Pr086a2: Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your youth. Did your birth mother live with you when you were 16 years old?**

*Int.: If no, inquire if stepmother lived there*

- 1: yes birth mother -> SOCPERSON = mother
- 2: no, but my stepmother = SOCPERSON = stepmother
- 3: no, neither birth mother nor stepmother

98: Don't know  
99: no answer

**Pr086a1: When you were 16 years old, did your biological father live with you?**

*Prog.: If Pr086a1 = 3*

*Int.: If no, inquire if stepfather lived there*

- 1: Yes, the biological father -> SOCPERSON = father.
- 2: No, but a stepfather -> SOCPERSON = stepfather
- 3: No, neither biological, nor stepfather

98: Don't know  
99: no answer

*Prog.: From here on a SOZPERSON should be clear. In the case that TP grew up neither with a father nor a mother, SOZPERSON would have to be set to missing and then the follow-up questions must not be asked (i.e., if Pr086a1 = Pr086a2=3)*

*Int.: if TP asks why only father or only mother was asked: due to time constraints we ask only one person, sometimes it is the mother, sometimes the father.*

Pr086b: Socialisation agent: German citizenship

*Prog.: If [Pr055 ==1 & (Pr086a1 = 1,2 ODER Pr086a2 = 1,2)] ODER [Pr055==2 & (Pr086a1 = 1,2 ODER Pr086a2 = 1,2) & pr057-pr023<17)]*

When you were 16 years old, did your SOCPERSON have German citizenship?

- 1: yes
- 2: no

98: Don't know

99: no answer

Pr086c: Socialisation agent: highest school degree

What is your SOCPERSON's highest school-leaving qualification? If your SOCPERSON went to school abroad, please name the corresponding degree in Germany.

1: School finished without graduation

2: Secondary school graduation, elementary school graduation, polytechnic high school graduation 8th or 9th grade

3: Realschulabschluss, Mittlere Reife, Fachschulreife or completion of polytechnic secondary school secondary school 10th grade

4: Advanced technical college entrance qualification (completion of a specialised secondary school, etc.)

5: secondary school-leaving certificate or extended secondary school-leaving certificate 12th grade (university entrance qualification)

6: other school-leaving qualification, namely: \_\_\_\_\_

98: Don't know

99: no answer

Pr086d: Socialisation agent: political interest

*Prog.: If (Pr086a1 = 1,2 ODER Pr086a2 = 1,2); use variables from CATI wave 1*

When you were 16 years old, do you remember if your SOCPERSON was interested in politics in <Germany [If pr055=1 | (pr055=2 & (pr057-pr023)<17)], /country of origin [If pr055=2 & (pr057-pr023)>16]? Was this very strong, strong, moderate, less strong, or not at all?

1: very strong

2: strong

3: moderate

4: less strong

5: not at all

98: Don't know

99: no answer